

## Chapter 5. National Security



*Frieze depicting battle between Greeks and Amazons, sculpted at  
Constanța, ca. A.D. 250*

THE MEASURE OF ROMANIA's success in the area of national security has been its ability to achieve and maintain the status of a sovereign, independent nation-state. Thus measured, Romania has succeeded over the long term despite some major defeats along the way. In its postwar incarnation as a communist state and member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact), Romania has enjoyed more national security than ever before.

In 1989 Romania relied on a relatively small professional military establishment and larger reserve and paramilitary forces to provide defense against external threats. The regular armed forces consisted of ground, air, and naval services as well as border guards. The Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Român—PCR, see Glossary) controlled the armed forces through its political apparatus within them. PCR General Secretary Nicolae Ceaușescu also exercised considerable personal control over the top military leaders by using his power to appoint and dismiss them.

Because Romania's military doctrine, strategy, and policies differed from those of its Warsaw Pact allies, the country had the reputation of being the maverick of the Warsaw Pact. Its independent positions frequently brought it into conflict with the Soviet Union, the senior alliance partner. Soviet reluctance to provide Romania with up-to-date weaponry has made it the most poorly equipped Warsaw Pact member state. Yet Romania's unique stance inside the Soviet-led alliance has helped it establish diverse military contacts and relations with countries outside the Warsaw Pact.

The PCR controlled Romania's system of law and order and operated it to maintain its absolute political power in the country. Judicial officials and courts routinely promoted the requirements of party and state over the rights of individual citizens. Ceaușescu provided the security and intelligence services with the resources and latitude to suppress his political opponents at home and abroad. Consequently there was little organized opposition to Ceaușescu in 1989.

Romania faced few serious external threats in the late 1980s. The greatest threats to national security stemmed from internal political and economic weaknesses. Many observers surmised that a prolonged struggle between would-be successors to Ceaușescu could result in political turmoil that would weaken the nation's defense posture. Likewise, economic decline and hardship could

give rise to internal disorder or even open rebellion against the PCR, which would make Romania more vulnerable to external pressures.

## **Historical Background**

Romania suffered frequent invasions and long periods of foreign domination throughout its history because of its location at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and its relative weakness. Its territorial integrity often hinged on alliances with powerful states that were willing to protect it against the designs of others. Thus the development of military power to overcome chronic weakness and to underwrite national independence has been a constant theme in Romanian history.

### **Defense of Romanian Lands in Ancient Times and the Middle Ages**

As early as 500 B.C., the Persians, Macedonians, and Romans threatened the Getae and Dacians, the two tribes from which modern Romanians descended (see Early History, from Prehistory to the Seventeenth Century, ch. 1). The Roman legions of Emperor Trajan (A.D. 98–117) conquered much of the region in the early years of the second century and occupied it for almost two centuries.

During the Middle Ages, the forebears of today's Romanians depended on the protection of a local military leader (*voivode*—see Glossary), who defended them in exchange for their allegiance and tribute. In times of danger, the free peasantry provided soldiers for local *voivodes* to command. The principalities of Moldavia and Walachia staved off the depredations of nomadic barbarians and avoided absorption by more powerful neighbors, but the Kingdom of Hungary and Hungarian noblemen ruled over the peasant descendants of the ancient Geto-Dacians in Transylvania and the Banat. All peoples of southeastern Europe, including the early Romanians, were soon subjected to several centuries of domination by an external power.

### **Ottoman Domination and the Struggle for National Unity and Independence**

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the lands of modern Romania became a battleground for Ottoman armies invading southeastern Europe and for local *voivodes* who resisted their incursions. Moldavia and Walachia succumbed and accepted rule by the Ottoman Empire despite some great victories won by their armies and *voivodes* such as Stephen the Great, Voivode of Moldavia (1457–1504). Although Ottoman suzerainty proved to be

relatively lenient, the sultans forbade the principalities to maintain armies that could be used to fight for independence. Michael the Brave, prince of Walachia (1593–1601), defied them, briefly emancipated and united the principalities, and defeated Ottoman armies in 1596. But the latter reasserted control over the principalities and killed Michael in 1601.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the expanding Russian and Habsburg, or Austro-Hungarian, empires began to contest Ottoman domination of the Balkans and fought many battles against the Ottoman armies on the territory of Moldavia and Walachia. A Walachian *voivode*, Tudor Vladimirescu, led a brigade of 6,000 men fighting in tsarist ranks in the Russo-Turkish War of 1806–12. Vladimirescu received the Russian Order of St. Vladimir for his service. In 1821 he led a rebellion in Walachia against Ottoman rule. Tsar Alexander I, however, did not approve of his actions, and Vladimirescu fell out of favor with the Russian Empire.

In 1848 Romanian nationalists formed an armed force to fight for the liberation and unification of the principalities into a modern state. Recognizing the challenge that this development implied, Russian and Habsburg armies invaded to forestall unification. The unsuccessful revolution of 1848 showed that there would not be a Romanian nation-state, independent of control by any empire, until the military power needed to defend it was established.

### *Military Development under Alexandru Ioan Cuza*

Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza, a hero of 1848 who became prince of the United Principalities of Moldavia and Walachia in 1859, emphasized the establishment of a large, modern army on the level of the major powers of Europe. He believed that the viability of the first autonomous Romanian state depended on strong armed forces, under national control, that were capable of deterring would-be invaders. He formed a Ministry of War and a general staff to administer and train the army of the United Principalities.

Cuza established a working military relationship with France, which had a tremendous influence on the development of the modern Romanian army. In 1859 the French emperor, Napoleon III, sent a ten-year military mission of instructors and specialists to the United Principalities. They trained the first Romanian army and directed the construction of factories and foundries to manufacture arms, equipment, ordnance, and other war matériel. Napoleon III accepted Moldavian and Walachian officers into French military academies at St. Cyr, Metz, Brest, and Saumur. Cuza also established programs of military cooperation with Belgium and

Serbia, and these programs supplied the United Principalities with several types of armaments. Cuza sent military attachés to observe combat around the world, including the battles of the American Civil War.

The Law on the Organization of the Army, drafted by Cuza and passed by the parliament of the United Principalities in 1864, established three major divisions at Bucharest, Iași, and Craiova; set up a regular standing army of 20,000 soldiers and territorial defense units with 25,000 reserves; and formed the first Romanian officer training college. Cuza's successor, a German prince, who ruled as Carol I (1866–1914), had served as an officer in the Prussian Army and experienced combat in Denmark in 1864. Carol I continued the military development initiated by Cuza; the army built by Cuza and Carol I played a decisive role in achieving full independence and sovereignty for Romania.

### ***War of Independence, 1877–78***

During the summer of 1877, Romanian soldiers guarded the 650-kilometer Danube River boundary and engaged in artillery duels with Ottoman gunners until Russian armies could arrive and cross the river to confront Ottoman forces. An initial defeat at the village of Plevna, located in the territory of modern Bulgaria, obliged the Russians to ask Carol I to send his forces across the Danube. Carol mobilized 40,000 soldiers and ordered them into combat alongside battered tsarist armies at Plevna, Rahova, and Vidin in contemporary Bulgaria. They made a decisive contribution to Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, thereby underpinning Romania's claim to national independence and sovereignty, which was officially recognized by the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

### **The Romanian Army in World War I**

Prior to World War I, Carol I emphasized military ties with Germany and forced France to compete with Germany as a source of military assistance for, and influence on, the Romanian state. The sympathies of most Romanians, however, lay with France. In 1913 Romania mobilized nearly 500,000 men against Bulgaria during the Second Balkan War and, at a decisive moment, marched virtually unopposed on the Bulgarian capital, Sofia.

Although it sympathized with France, Britain, and Russia, Romania maintained an armed neutrality during the first two years of World War I. The warring alliances tried to induce Romania to enter the war on their side in return for territorial gain. The Central Powers offered Bukovina and Bessarabia, which would be

carved out of tsarist Russia. The Triple Entente promised Romania Transylvania, which would be detached from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Romania finally joined the Entente in August 1916 and fought alongside Russian armies on the eastern front. It mobilized approximately 750,000 men against German and Austro-Hungarian soldiers in the northern Carpathian Mountains and against German and Bulgarian troops along its southern border. Romanian forces suffered a string of early and catastrophic defeats, and Bucharest was occupied in December 1916. The final blow to the Romanian effort in the war was the collapse of Russian armies in October 1917, which disrupted Romania's supply lines. As a result, Romania was obliged to sue for peace in December 1917. Romania lost approximately 400,000 soldiers to combat wounds or disease, as well as untold numbers of civilians.

Although Romania was a defeated power, its French and British allies eventually were victorious, and it reaped major territorial gains as a result of the peace treaties that officially ended World War I. It received Transylvania from Austria-Hungary, Dobruja from Bulgaria, and Bukovina and Bessarabia from Soviet Russia (see fig. 1). These gains nearly doubled its size but also earned it the enmity of its immediate neighbors.

## **Security During the Interwar Years and World War II**

Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia formed the Little Entente under French influence during the interwar years to act as a counterweight against the possible resurgence of German influence in southeastern and central Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. Romania continued to look to France to guarantee its security, at least until Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity in the Munich Agreement of September 1938. After Munich, French guarantees meant little, and Romania accommodated the reality of German hegemony in the region.

The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August 1939 squeezed Romania between the territorial ambitions of Germany and the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1940, Germany forced Romania to cede territory to Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union (see *Greater Romania to the End of World War I, 1920-45*, ch. 1). In September German forces occupied Romanian territory under the pretext of protecting the country's oil resources, access to which had already been secured in a 1939 commercial agreement. In November 1940, Romania joined Germany, Italy, and Japan in the Anti-Comintern Pact and became Hitler's base of operations to conquer the Balkans.

On June 22, 1941, Romania's third and fourth armies, a total of thirty divisions, joined Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union. Its forces were by far the largest and possibly the best of the fifty divisions allied with the Wehrmacht (German armed forces) on the eastern front. Romania joined the war largely in the hope of regaining northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, establishing a greater Romania at the Soviet Union's expense along the northern Black Sea coast, and also because it was simply too weak to resist Germany.

The third and fourth armies fought at Odessa and Sevastopol but became bogged down with a German army group in front of Stalingrad in October 1942. In November the Red Army counteroffensive at Stalingrad focused on encircling the powerful German Sixth Army by striking its flanks held by the relatively weaker Romanian armies. Northeast of Stalingrad, three Soviet armies punched through the Romanian Third Army and its spearhead, the Romanian First Armored Division. Southwest of Stalingrad, two Soviet armies smashed the Sixth Corps and the Eighteenth Infantry Division, the strongest elements of the Romanian Army. By November 23, the Soviet armies completed their encirclement of the German Sixth Army. In bearing the brunt of the Red Army's breakthrough at Stalingrad, nineteen Romanian divisions were badly mauled, and more than 250,000 Romanian soldiers were killed, wounded, captured, or missing in action. In August 1943, the war reached Romanian soil dramatically: 178 B-24 bombers from the United States Army's eighth and ninth air forces conducted a bombing raid from North African airfields against the oil fields at Ploiești, a major source of fuel for the Wehrmacht. The raid reduced Romanian oil production by half and destroyed much of the country's military industry.

The Red Army refocused its strategic attention on Romania in mid-1944. It sought to occupy Romania, knock it out of the war, and from there advance across the Danube Delta through the Carpathian Mountains into Yugoslavia and Hungary before wheeling north to roll up the right flank of Nazi Germany. Having penetrated northern Bukovina at the end of 1943, the Red Army launched the Iași-Kishinev Operation in August 1944 by sending eight armies with more than 1 million men across the Prut River along two convergent axes from Iași and Kishinev in Bessarabia to drive through the Focșani Gap to capture the Ploiești oil fields and Bucharest. Soviet armies driving from Kishinev pinned down the remnants of the German Sixth Army and seven divisions of Romania's Third Army on the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, the bulk of Soviet forces driving from Iași encircled the German Eighth

Army and the remaining fourteen divisions of the Romanian Fourth Army. On the first day of the operation, Red Army forces destroyed five divisions of the Fourth Army in fighting northwest of Iași. Remaining Romanian divisions simply disintegrated as their troops deserted the front.

After the August 23, 1944, coup d'état against military dictator General Ion Antonescu, King Michael arranged Romania's surrender to the Red Army. The following day, Hitler ordered 150 German bombers to attack Bucharest in a vain attempt to force Romania to rejoin the war. Romania then declared war on Germany and put its scattered forces under the command of the Red Army. These forces included parts of the Fourth Army; the four divisions of the First Army, which guarded the disputed Romanian-Hungarian border during the war; and the Tudor Vladimirescu First Volunteer Division, a force recruited by the Red Army from Romanian prisoners of war taken at Stalingrad who were willing to submit to communist indoctrination. These forces helped to liberate Bucharest and clear German forces from the rest of Romania, and they finished the war fighting alongside the Red Army in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In all, Romania suffered an estimated 600,000 casualties during World War II.

Under the terms of the September 1944 armistice signed in Moscow, Romania accepted Red Army occupation of the country at least until peace negotiations commenced, agreed to pay US\$300 million in war reparations, and put its oil production, rolling stock, and merchant fleet at the Soviet Union's disposal. Given the situation on the ground, the Soviet Union dominated the Allied Control Commission, which administered Romania for three years after the war. The Soviet Union also retained the right to maintain its occupation of Romania in order to keep open its lines of communication to Soviet forces occupying Austria. Under the 1947 peace treaty, Romania permanently surrendered large tracts to Bulgaria and the Soviet Union (see Armistice Negotiations and Soviet Occupation, ch. 1).

## **Development of the Romanian Armed Forces after World War II**

The Soviet occupation of Romania made the Red Army the predominant external influence on the development of the Romanian armed forces after 1945, especially after the communists seized power in 1947. After the war, obviously pro-German elements were purged from Romania's armed forces under Red Army supervision. Meanwhile, a second division of former Romanian prisoners of war that was organized and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union entered in late 1945 to join the Tudor Vladimirescu First Volunteer

Division as the nucleus of the new Romanian Army under Soviet control. Once the communist regime took power, fully 30 percent of the Romanian officers and noncommissioned officers were purged from the ranks. They represented Romania's most experienced soldiers and the greatest source of opposition to the increasing Sovietization of the Romanian Army. The Romanian military establishment was reorganized according to the Soviet model. Soviet officers served as advisers to Romanian units down to the regimental level, and large numbers of Romanian officers went to the Soviet Union to receive education and training.

Emil Bodnaraș, a member of the PCR Politburo who was in exile in Moscow during the war and had returned to Romania with the Red Army in 1944, became the first postwar minister of national defense in 1947. In many cases, trusted party functionaries were simply assigned appropriate military ranks and appointed to crucial posts in the armed forces. Political loyalty to the PCR served as a more important selection criterion than did professional military competence or experience. The party closely monitored the political attitudes of officers who were not members of the PCR.

When the PCR was firmly in control of the country and Romania securely within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union was willing to withdraw its occupation forces, which happened in May 1958. By the mid-1960s, however, the Ceaușescu regime had begun to de-Sovietize the armed forces, to reemphasize Romanian military traditions, and to carve out an autonomous position within the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact. The Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, was the watershed event in postwar Romanian military development.

## **Military Doctrine and Strategy**

In 1989 Romania had a military doctrine unique within the Warsaw Pact, a doctrine that had emerged during the two decades following the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Unlike the other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact member states, it did not subscribe to the alliance's joint military doctrine devised by the Soviet Union. Romania's political leadership developed a military doctrine based on the country's experience in interstate relations as well as its own interest in maintaining power. Ceaușescu was increasingly identified as the founder of Romanian military doctrine and came to be linked to legendary Romanian military heroes and leaders such as Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave.

## **Evolution of Military Doctrine**

Because historically its enemies had had tremendous numerical

and technological superiority, Romania had succumbed to them despite occasional periods of rebellion and armed resistance. Experiences as the ally of Russia in World War I, Nazi Germany in World War II, and the Soviet Union afterward had taught Romania, however, that allowing a stronger country to dictate its political and military course could lead to ruin and loss of sovereignty. In the wake of the Warsaw Pact action against Czechoslovakia in 1968, Ceausescu deviated from standard Warsaw Pact doctrine and promulgated a distinct national military doctrine for Romania. Known as "War of the Entire People" (*Lupta Intregului Popor*), this doctrine was largely a reaction to the failure of Czechoslovakia to resist the Soviet-led invasion. Its basic premise was that the people would resist with all means at their disposal any "imperialist" incursion into Romania and would defend the nation's sovereignty, independence, and socialism (see Glossary). Thus, War of the Entire People implied defense not only of the nation but also of Romania's particular style of socialism and the political power of the PCR hierarchy that controls it.

War of the Entire People defined imperialism in an omnidirectional sense as the greatest threat to Romania. Any nation, whether a capitalist North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country or an erstwhile socialist Warsaw Pact ally that sought to dominate Romania militarily, constituted an imperialist threat. Although left unstated, in the context of the time, the clearest threat was a Soviet or Warsaw Pact intervention in Romania similar to what occurred in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The Law on National Defense of the Socialist Republic of Romania, passed by the Grand National Assembly (GNA) in 1972, codified and further elaborated War of the Entire People. The law stated that Romania would declare war only to defend itself or a Warsaw Pact ally against external aggression. The 1972 law also made acceptance of surrender, cession, or occupation of national territory an illegal act. It made GNA approval a requirement for the entry of foreign troops into Romania and declared that Romania's armed forces may respond only to orders or directives issued by the country's national command authority. These provisions were designed to prevent the Soviet Union from disrupting national resistance to an invasion of Romania or justifying an invasion by installing a compliant faction of the PCR to request and legitimize the Soviet Union's "fraternal assistance" or intervention.

War of the Entire People mandated a system of national territorial defense modeled on that of Yugoslavia and called for mobilizing all of the country's human and material resources to mount continuous resistance against any aggressor, invader, or occupier

until Romania was liberated. Thus the regular armed forces ceased to be the exclusive focus of military doctrine. The Patriotic Guards were established and received great attention and considerable resources (see Reserves and Mobilization, this ch.). To explain the relationship of the regular army and the irregular Patriotic Guards, Romanian military historians began writing about the role of peasant masses in rising up to join princes, nobles, and the professional warrior caste to defend the Romanian lands against invasions during the Middle Ages.

### **Military Strategy**

According to the assumptions explicit in its military doctrine since 1968, Romania's greatest likelihood of future military conflict is a defensive war fought on its territory against a more powerful aggressor. Thus, Romania's strategy aims at victory achieved not through a military defeat of an invading enemy, but through massive, prolonged resistance that denies an enemy the possibility of a rapid, successful military operation against Romania. During a protracted war of attrition against a foreign occupation, Romania would seek international sympathy and support for its struggle to throw off its invader. Strategists hoped that the aggressor would suffer international political opprobrium outweighing any conceivable strategic benefit of a continued occupation. Meanwhile, Romanians would drain the morale of occupying forces through constant harassing actions. As a result, an invader would eventually withdraw or retreat from Romania to cut its political and military losses.

To execute this strategic concept, Romania's political and military leaders have developed a particular type of military organization and tactics. A strategy of prolonged resistance against invading forces depends on the ability of the relatively small regular armed forces to slow an advancing enemy and to provide time for paramilitary units to mobilize. Although the latter's effectiveness in combat is uncertain, Romanian experts assert that one-third of the country's population can be put under arms in a national emergency and that it would require an army of 1 million men to maintain an occupation of Romania, much less to pacify it. Romania's leaders have elaborated the basic operational and tactical principles that underlie this strategy. Foremost among them, Romania would fight a more powerful invader on terms that would neutralize the latter's numerical and technological superiority. It would avoid large battles between its ground forces and the enemy in favor of small-unit attacks on an invading army in areas where it is unable to deploy large forces.



*Soldiers at Lake Herăstrău  
Courtesy Sam and Sarah Stulberg*

Romania placed confidence in its ability to choose propitious times and favorable terrain for battle. The use of surprise and night attacks would help the paramilitary forces offset the preponderance of a conventional occupation army. Familiarity with the country's rugged terrain would also favor Romanian defenders. The narrow valleys of the Carpathian Mountains and Transylvanian Alps, which cut through the center of Romania, could serve as a formidable base of operations for protracted guerrilla warfare against an invader. Finally, Romanian doctrine calls for the local population to follow a "scorched earth" policy throughout the countryside along the enemy's invasion route to deny it sources of supply and to complicate its logistical support of an extended occupation of Romania.

### **Arms Control**

In 1989 Romania viewed arms control as an element of its military doctrine and strategy that had the potential to promote its national security. It was the most vocal Eastern European proponent of a general military disengagement in Europe, maintaining that general reductions in armaments and military activities by NATO and the Warsaw Pact would minimize the threat of a general European conflict. In 1985 Romania repeated its previous calls for the establishment of a nuclear and chemical weapons-free zone in the Balkans.

Romania adopted positions on arms control issues that would reduce the ability of its Warsaw Pact allies to intervene in its internal affairs. It urged that NATO and the Warsaw Pact be dissolved simultaneously. It called for the United States and the Soviet Union to cease maintaining bases or troops on the territory of allied countries, declaring that they constitute a violation of the host country's sovereignty and provide opportunities for external pressure on the host government.

Romania strongly advocated, and benefited from, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in Helsinki in 1975. The confidence-building measures contained in the Final Act stipulate that when a signatory nation conducts large-scale maneuvers, involving 30,000 or more troops within 300 kilometers of international boundaries, it should give neighboring states prior notice of the size and geographic area of the exercise. This provision made it more difficult to use maneuvers as a pretext to mobilize for an invasion of another country. Thus, the Helsinki Final Act complicated possible Soviet military action against Romania.

## **Armed Forces**

In 1989 Romania maintained 180,000 men in its armed forces, or about 1 soldier for every 128 citizens—the second lowest ratio of regular military personnel to population in the Warsaw Pact. It compensated for this small regular force by maintaining large reserve and paramilitary formations.

## **Command and Control of the Armed Forces**

In 1989 Romania had a well-developed centralized system for administering and directing its armed forces. The government had nominal responsibility for the armed forces, but the PCR hierarchy exercised real authority. As PCR general secretary and chief of state, Ceaușescu also held the powerful positions of supreme commander of the armed forces and chairman of the Defense Council.

Yet there have been periodic indications of friction between the professional military and the Ceaușescu regime. During the 1970s and early 1980s, Ceaușescu had legitimate reasons to be concerned about the potential for a pro-Soviet military coup d'état. His policy of remaining independent of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact made him more dependent on the loyalty and reliability of the armed forces to maintain his political power than was the case in other communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which could rely on Soviet intervention to preserve their rule against domestic challenges.

### ***Government and Party Organization for Defense***

The GNA had constitutional responsibility for national security and the authority to declare war or a national emergency, to order mobilization, to ratify an armistice or peace treaty, to appoint the supreme commander of the armed forces, and to award the ranks of marshal, general, and admiral. When the GNA was not in session, however, the Council of State assumed these powers and Ceaușescu, as chairman of the latter, wielded these powers effectively. The small circle of Ceaușescu, his family, and his closest political associates exercised real national security and defense policy-making authority, requesting and using expert advice as they deemed necessary.

Composed of party and state officials, the Defense Council examined and coordinated all problems related to national security, including both external defense and internal security. It provided strategic direction to the armed forces, supervised military-related industries, and made national military and economic mobilization plans to be executed by the Council of State. In addition to Ceaușescu, the Defense Council also included the prime minister, minister of national defense, chief of the Higher Political Council of the Army, chief of staff of the Patriotic Guards, minister of interior, minister of foreign affairs, and chairman of the State Planning Committee. The chief of the General Staff of the armed forces served as secretary to the Defense Council. Theoretically responsible to the GNA and the Council of State, the Defense Council directly advised Ceaușescu on national security and defense issues.

The Defense Council structure also existed at lower administrative levels. Local party first secretaries chaired defense councils in the forty *județe* (counties) and some larger municipalities. Other members included the local people's council secretary, commander of the nearest military garrison, his political deputy, chief of staff of the Patriotic Guards for the area, head of the local Ministry of Interior office, Union of Communist Youth (Uniunea Tineretului Comunist—UTC) officials, and directors of major economic enterprises in the area. In peacetime local defense councils had responsibility for organizing all resources and productive capacity under their authority, for making local mobilization plans to fulfill national defense requirements, and for operating the military conscription system. In wartime they were charged with maintaining uninterrupted, or restoring disrupted, militarily essential production.

In contrast to the policy-making authority and strategic control exercised by the PCR hierarchy and the Defense Council, the




Figure 6. Government and Party Organization for Defense, 1988

Ministry of National Defense had day-to-day administrative authority over the armed forces in peacetime and was responsible for implementing PCR policies within them. In peacetime the general staff made provisional strategic and operational plans, based on general guidance from the Defense Council, coordinated the actions of the armed services, and exercised operational and tactical control of the armed forces as a whole.

The Ministry of National Defense comprised several directorates and other organizations (see fig. 6). The Directorate for Military Intelligence (*Direcția de Informații a Armatei—DIA*) provided the General Staff with assessments of the strategic intentions of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and monitored indications and warnings of imminent hostilities against Romania. The Directorate for Military Publishing operated the Military Publishing House and published the monthly armed forces journal *Viața Militară* (Military Life) and the daily military newspaper *Apărarea Patriei* (Defense

of the Homeland). Several directorates of the Ministry of National Defense had extensive interconnections with civilian ministries, especially ones that supplied the armed forces matériel, armaments, and logistical support. For example, in 1989 a Romanian admiral headed the Department of Naval Transportation within the civilian Ministry of Transportation and Telecommunications. In wartime other important ministries like it would be subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense. The Higher Political Council of the Army enjoyed a unique, somewhat autonomous status within the Ministry of National Defense. It operated as part of the latter but was subordinate to the PCR Central Committee. The Center for Studies and Research in Military History and Theory examined Romania's military experience as an input to the formulation of strategic and operational plans by the general staff.

### *Party Control of the Military*

Of all national institutions, in 1989 only the armed forces were potentially strong and organized enough to challenge PCR rule. For that reason, the Ceaușescu regime tightly controlled the military establishment by maintaining a PCR apparatus within it, co-opting the highest-ranking officers, manipulating promotions and appointments, and allowing the internal security service to operate within the armed forces. Ceaușescu and the PCR exerted their control over the military through the Higher Political Council of the Army, the party's military branch. Ceaușescu himself was given general officer rank and served as the highest party representative in the armed forces when he headed the Higher Political Council of the Army's forerunner between 1950 and 1954.

The Higher Political Council of the Army conducted political education within the military, supervised a huge network of political officers from the highest command echelon to company-sized units, reviewed promotions and other personnel matters, and monitored and reported on the political reliability and loyalty of military personnel to the Ceaușescu regime. Its political indoctrination program was founded on socialist and nationalist ideologies and emphasized the leading role of Ceaușescu and the PCR in society and the economy. It conspicuously lacked the pro-Soviet sentiment and "socialist internationalism" characteristic of indoctrination in the other Warsaw Pact countries. In 1989 approximately 90 percent of all soldiers and sailors were PCR or UTC members. Virtually all officers were PCR members, and usually only PCR members were eligible for promotions to higher ranks. Officers were subject to party discipline outside the military chain of command.

Thus the PCR had the power to remove officers of all ranks on political grounds.

In addition to using formal party mechanisms, Ceaușescu exercised other means of control over the armed forces. Many high-ranking officers were fully integrated into party and state policy-making bodies and enjoyed considerable privilege and status because of their positions. In 1989 three general officers, Ion Dinca, Ion Coman, and former Minister of National Defense Constantin Olteanu were full or alternate members of the PCR Political Executive Committee (Polexco). Dinca was also one of three first deputy prime ministers. Coman was the PCR Central Committee secretary for military and security affairs. The minister of national defense was usually a full PCR Central Committee member when he occupied his post and then received a promotion to the Polexco. Olteanu became minister of national defense in 1980 and a Polexco member in 1983. Vasile Milea became minister of national defense in 1985 but had not achieved Polexco membership as of mid-1989. During the 1980s, military representation in the PCR Central Committee dropped from more than 4 percent of the membership to about 2 percent. In addition to the minister of national defense, the chief of the general staff, the chief of the Higher Political Council of the Army, and the commanders of the armed services and army corps were also Central Committee members.

The domestic security service, the Department of State Security (Departamentul Securității Statului—Securitate), thoroughly penetrated the country's armed forces and had informants in place at all levels to monitor the loyalty of military personnel to the PCR and to Ceaușescu personally. One of its directorates had responsibility for counterespionage within the armed forces. The Ceaușescu regime's major concern was the degree of Soviet influence within the professional officer corps. The Soviets reportedly had tried to exploit their traditionally strong ties with the officer corps to pressure Ceaușescu. Some observers believed that the Soviet Union might lend its support to a military coup d'état in the expectation that Romania would become a more compliant ally under different leadership.

### *Ceaușescu and the Military*

The armed forces, which had a history of intervention in politics before the advent of communist power, have been the only plausible threat to Ceaușescu's rule since the late 1960s. He has frequently rotated cadres within the Ministry of National Defense and the top military command positions to prevent the emergence of strong, politically independent military leaders. And he has



*Casa Centrala a Armatei (Central Army House), Bucharest  
Courtesy Scott Edelman*

unceremoniously fired senior officers and promoted ambitious lower-ranking officers to higher posts, thereby using his patronage to command their loyalty.

In 1971 forty general staff officers were purged and arrested, conceivably for plotting to overthrow Ceaușescu. In May 1974, Ceaușescu unexpectedly purged five senior commanders and in 1976 suddenly dismissed General Ion Ionita, his long-time political ally. Rumors of anti-Ceaușescu conspiracies or attempted revolts within the military circulated freely in Romania in the 1980s. In 1983 an abortive military coup d'état was reportedly crushed and twelve officers were executed for plotting it. Ceaușescu then made his brother Ilie a lieutenant general and appointed him deputy minister of national defense and chief of the Higher Political Council of the Army to increase his control of the armed forces. Later in 1983, Ceaușescu spent considerable energy visiting military units, apparently in an effort to reaffirm his credentials as supreme commander of the armed forces. Ceaușescu's handling of this alleged revolt amply demonstrated his mastery of the mechanisms of party and personal control over the armed forces, which has enabled him to eliminate potential threats before they become organized challenges.

Whether rumored military revolts were confirmed or not, the professional military had real grievances with the PCR and the

Ceaușescu regime. Many of Ceaușescu's military policies contradicted some basic interests of the officer corps, diminished its professional status, and served as potential sources of political and military friction. Some officers opposed Ceaușescu's policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union because it denied the armed forces access to more sophisticated Soviet weapons and equipment as well as military assistance. Romanian officers might have been willing to accept a less independent military policy in return for a larger supply of higher-quality arms from the Soviet Union. The officer corps probably chafed at Ceaușescu's reductions in the country's defense budget as well as the extensive use of armed forces personnel in domestic construction projects, which had a negative impact on military training and readiness. Ceaușescu's habit of manipulating high-level military promotions to further his political interests and suddenly dismissing top military commanders also annoyed professional officers.

The importance ascribed to the Patriotic Guards in Romania's military doctrine and strategy served to undermine the prestige and professional autonomy of the regular armed forces. With its emphasis on the employment of irregular paramilitary and guerrilla detachments, War of the Entire People required the Ministry of National Defense to cooperate closely with the Patriotic Guards and supply them with equipment. The latter's requirement for relatively large quantities of low-technology, low-cost arms conflicted with the former's desire for smaller numbers of more advanced weapons and equipment. Although the Ministry of National Defense had to share its budget and resources with the Patriotic Guards, it exercised less than full control over them. The considerable independence of the Patriotic Guards led Western analysts to conclude that they were established, at least partially, to serve as a rival armed force counterbalancing the regular armed forces.

### **Armed Services**

Professional officers have stressed that, despite the emphasis placed on Romania's irregular or paramilitary units, only the traditional armed services are trained and equipped to fulfill the full range of military missions. In 1989 the ground forces remained the largest, most important, and most influential armed service. However, the air and naval forces had steadily developed and increased in importance to Romania's military strategy during the preceding two decades.

#### ***Ground Forces***

In 1989 the ground forces numbered 140,000 men, of whom

two-thirds were conscripted soldiers. The country was divided into Cluj, Bacău, and Bucharest military regions in the west, east, and south, respectively (see fig. 7). In wartime the ground forces in each military region would become an army corps with their headquarters in Cluj-Napoca, Iași, and Bucharest. The ground forces consisted of eight motorized rifle (infantry) divisions, two tank divisions, four mountain infantry brigades, and four airborne regiments. Motorized rifle divisions were organized along the Soviet model with three motorized rifle regiments, one tank regiment, and a full complement of 12,000 infantry soldiers (see fig. 8). They were mechanized to a considerable extent, operating more than 3,000 BTR-50, BTR-60, TAB-2, and TAB-77 armored personnel carriers and more than 400 BRDM-1, BRDM-2, and TAB-C armored reconnaissance vehicles. Tank divisions had three tank regiments, one motorized rifle regiment, and 10,000 men. Tank divisions operated more than 800 T-54 and T-55, 350 M-77, and 30 T-72 tanks.

The artillery, antitank, and air defense regiments of ground forces divisions provided specialized fire support that enabled motorized rifle and tank regiments to maneuver. In 1989 the artillery regiments of motorized rifle and tank divisions included two artillery battalions, one multiple rocket launcher battalion, and one surface-to-surface missile battalion. Romania's artillery units operated nearly 1,000 Soviet-designed towed artillery pieces with calibers ranging from 76 to 152 millimeters, approximately 175 SU-100 self-propelled assault guns, and more than 325 multiple rocket launchers, including the 122mm truck-mounted BM-21 and 130mm M-51. Surface-to-surface missile battalions were divided into three or four batteries, each equipped with one missile launcher. They operated thirty FROG-3 and eighteen SCUD missile launchers. The FROG-3, a tactical missile first introduced in 1960, was being replaced in other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies. Proven to be fairly inaccurate in combat, FROG and SCUD missiles would be ineffective weapons carrying conventional high-explosive warheads. Tipped with nuclear or chemical warheads, however, they could be devastating. According to one former Romanian official writing in 1988, Romania produced chemical agents that could be delivered by battlefield missiles.

Antitank regiments were equipped with Soviet-made 73mm, 76mm, and 82mm recoilless rifles, 57mm antitank guns, and AT-1/SNAPPER and AT-3/SAGGER antitank guided missiles (ATGM). Whereas the AT-1/SNAPPER was primarily a shoulder-fired weapon, more advanced AT-3/SAGGER ATGMs were mounted on BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles.



*Figure 7. Major Military Installations, 1989*

Air defense regiments provided motorized rifle and tank divisions with mobile protection against enemy air attack. They consisted of two anti-aircraft artillery battalions and one surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalion, each composed of several batteries. Air defense regiments were equipped with medium-range SA-6 SAM launcher vehicles, shoulder-fired short-range SA-7 missiles, and more than 500 30mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, and 100mm anti-aircraft guns. Romania's mountain infantry and airborne units are noteworthy. Approximately 30 percent of the country's terrain is mountainous; therefore, these units can be employed to great effect. Transported by helicopters, which Romania began manufacturing in the mid-1970s, the mountain units are highly mobile.

### ***Air Force***

In 1989 the Romanian Air Force had approximately 32,000 personnel and, because of the high technical qualifications required

of them, less than one-third were conscripts. The air force operated more than 350, mostly Soviet-built, combat aircraft. It also had responsibility for transport, reconnaissance, and rotary wing aircraft as well as the national air defense system. The air force's primary mission was to protect and support the ground forces in defending the country against invasion. It also had a major role in operating, maintaining, and supplying trained personnel for the national airline TAROM.

The air force was divided into three tactical air divisions. Each air division had two regiments with two or three squadrons of interceptor and one squadron of ground attack aircraft as well as supporting transport, reconnaissance, and helicopter elements (see fig. 9). With a few notable exceptions, most aircraft in the Romanian order of battle were designed and produced in the Soviet Union. The air force had fifteen interceptor squadrons, three with fifteen MiG-23 fighters each and twelve with similar numbers of MiG-21 fighters. Romania received its first MiG-23s from the Soviet Union in the early 1980s, nearly ten years after the plane entered service in Soviet and some other Warsaw Pact air forces. Soviet allies in Third World countries such as Syria, Libya, and Iraq had the MiG-23 in their inventories before Romania did. Romanian fighters carried the 1960s-era Soviet AA-2/ATOLL air-to-air missile. The air force had six ground attack squadrons operating eighty-five 1950s-era MiG-17 aircraft made in the 1950s, which had been modified and transferred from duty as interceptors when Romania acquired the MiG-21, and thirty-five Romanian-built IAR-93 Orao ground-attack fighters. In 1989 the air force had an additional 125 Orao close air-support aircraft on order.

Transport, reconnaissance, and helicopter squadrons supported the ground forces by airlifting ground forces units, collecting intelligence on the composition and disposition of hostile forces, and conducting medical evacuation, mobile command, and utility functions. In 1989 Romania had eleven An-24, eight An-26 (both smaller than the United States C-130 transport), and several other Soviet transport aircraft, as well as four Polish Li-2 and two American-made Boeing 707 transports. Using its total lift capability, however, it could transport only the men and equipment of one airborne battalion. Reconnaissance squadrons operated twenty Soviet Il-28 aircraft built in the 1950s. Helicopter squadrons operated fifty-five IAR-316B Allouette III and forty IAR-330 Puma helicopters produced in Romania under French license and twenty-five Soviet Mi-4 and Mi-8 helicopters. Helicopter squadrons directly supported the ground forces by providing enhanced mobility and fire power for small units. The air force had a large pilot training




Figure 8. Organization of a Motorized Rifle Division, 1987


program, which reflected an apparent intention to develop increased capabilities. In 1989 it had sixty Czechoslovak-produced L-29 and L-39 jet training aircraft, twenty older Soviet MiG-15 trainers, and a small but growing inventory of Romanian-built trainers.

The fourteen interceptor squadrons of the air force were the first line of defense in the country's air defense system. The air force also controlled the ground-based air defense network of 135 SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, early warning radar, and command, control, and communications equipment dispersed among twenty sites around the country. The national military command authority in Bucharest and in the country's oil-producing region around Ploiești were the areas best protected against air attack. In 1989 Romania still depended on the Soviet Union to supply all of its air defense weapons and equipment.

### *Naval Forces*

In 1989 the Romanian Navy had more than 7,500 sailors, organized into a Black Sea Fleet, the Danube Squadron, and the shore-based Coastal Defense. It had the mission of defending the country's coastlines against enemy naval bombardments and amphibious assaults, or at least blunting them. All sailors were trained to use infantry weapons and tactics to fight in a land war, in the likely event that the Romanian Navy would be neutralized in a surface engagement with a more powerful naval force. Its major naval bases and shipyards were the Black Sea ports of Mangalia and Constanța. It also made use of Danube River anchorages at Brăila, Giurgiu, Sulina, Galați, and Tulcea. The Romanian naval order-of-battle included several minor surface combatants and larger numbers of fast-attack craft and patrol boats. Beginning in the early 1980s, Romania placed greater resources into its naval construction program and built new patrol boats, frigates, and even destroyers using Chinese and Soviet designs. This increased production may have been intended to increase Romania's export sales. In 1986 Romania took delivery of a Soviet Kilo-class diesel submarine, and it was speculated that additional units could be received in subsequent years.

In 1985 Romania commissioned its first large surface unit, a 6,000-ton guided missile destroyer, the *Muntenia*, built in the Mangalia shipyard. The *Muntenia* was based on the design of the 1960s-era Soviet Kashin-class destroyers. Its weapons were almost exclusively of Soviet manufacture. *Muntenia* had four dual SS-N-2C/STYX antiship missile launchers and one dual SA-N-4 surface-to-air missile launcher. It was equipped with 100mm guns, two torpedo tubes, and a helicopter deck that could shelter two



Source: Based on information from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988-89*, London, 1988, 52-53.

Figure 9. Organization of a Romanian Air Force Division, 1987

IAR-316B Alouette III antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters. In 1989 a second unit of the same type as the *Muntenia* was under construction. Between 1983 and 1985, Romania built three 1,900-ton Tetal-class frigates using the 1970s-era Soviet Koni-class as a model. Equipped with a dual 76mm gun, antiaircraft guns, four torpedo tubes, and two ASW rocket launchers, these frigates could be used as submarine chasers or maritime escorts. A fourth Tetal unit was under construction in 1989. For logistical support, the navy operated two 3,500-ton Croitor-class combatant tenders. Modeled on the Soviet Don-class, they had four dual SA-N-5 surface-to-air missile launchers, one dual 57mm gun, antiaircraft guns, and a helicopter deck. These ships also went to sea in the early 1980s.

In 1989 the Romanian Navy operated the following ships: three 400-ton Poti-class ASW corvettes armed with two twin 57mm gun turrets, four torpedo tubes, and two ASW rocket launchers (obtained from the Soviet Union in 1970); three 300-ton Kronshtadt-class ASW corvettes equipped with various guns and depth charges (received from the Soviet Union in 1956); six Osa I-class fast attack craft (missile) carrying four SS-N-2A/STYX antiship missile launchers and antiaircraft guns (transferred from the Soviet

Union in the 1960s); twenty-two 40-ton Huchuan-class hydrofoil fast attack craft (torpedo) armed with two torpedo tubes and anti-aircraft guns (the first three units were delivered from China in 1973); twelve 200-ton Romanian-built Epitrop-class fast attack craft, which mounted four torpedo tubes and anti-aircraft guns on an Osa-class hull; twenty-five Shanghai II-class fast attack craft (gun) (received from China beginning in 1977); two 1,500-ton Cosar-class minelayers armed with 57mm guns (built in Romania during the early 1980s); and four modernized Democratia-class coastal minesweepers (built in the 1950s in the German Democratic Republic—East Germany).

Coastal Defense was the shore-based component of defense against attack from the Black Sea. Headquartered at Constanța, the 2,000-man Coastal Defense regiment operated in several sectors along Romania's 245-kilometer coastline and was organized into ten artillery batteries with 130mm, 150mm, and 152mm guns, three antiship missile batteries with SSC-2B/SAMLET launchers, and eight batteries of anti-aircraft artillery.

The Danube Squadron included eighteen 85-ton VB-class riverine patrol boats, armed with 85mm main guns, 81mm mortars, and anti-aircraft guns, eight 40-ton VG-class boats, and twenty-five VD-class inshore minesweeping boats. It also operated several units of the 400-ton Brutar-class armored boat, equipped with a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher and a 100mm gun mounted in a tank turret. The Danube Squadron's mission was to defeat hostile ground forces attempting to ford the Danube River and to ensure the river's availability as a line of communication.

### ***Border Guards***

In 1989 the Border Guards were a separate, smaller armed service equal in standing to the other three services and also subordinate to the Ministry of National Defense. With a force of 20,000 soldiers, the Border Guards had the mission of defending Romania's nearly 3,200-kilometer border with Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union and preventing Romanians from leaving the country illegally.

The Border Guards were organized into twelve brigades and were equipped essentially in the same way as the motorized infantry troops. These brigades were responsible for thirty-two-kilometer-wide border sectors of varying lengths depending on the difficulty of the terrain in their area of operation. They staffed watch towers, patrolled fences and well-lit border strips, and maintained electronic sensors and surveillance systems along the border. Approximately 600 Romanian Navy sailors functioned as the maritime

component of the Border Guards. They operated several Shanghai II-class fast attack craft (gun) as riverine patrol boats on the Danube borders with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

In the 1980s, the Border Guards reportedly used lethal force to prevent illegal emigration to Romania's more liberal neighbors, Hungary and Yugoslavia. Consequently, the borders with Yugoslavia and Hungary were more heavily guarded than were those with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. The latter were ordinarily guarded only at major highway and railroad-crossing points. The Border Guards also helped to enforce customs and export laws by controlling the flow of goods across Romania's borders.

The Border Guards were the first line of Romania's defense in wartime. They had the mission of preventing an invader's special forces units from infiltrating to sabotage, disrupt, or disorganize military mobilization. In the event of an invasion or attack, the Border Guards would offer initial resistance, use delaying tactics, and try to impede the enemy's advance until the ground forces and Patriotic Guards units could mobilize and reinforce them.

### **Military Personnel**

In 1989 virtually all men who were eighteen years of age or older had to serve in the armed forces or Ministry of Interior units to maintain them at full strength. The terms of service in the armed forces were sixteen months in the ground forces and air force and two years in the navy and in the Border Guards. The armed units of the Ministry of Interior, the security troops, and the militia (police) also served two years (see Ministry of Interior and Security Forces, this ch.). They were selected during the same annual induction cycle as were those called to serve in the armed forces. Students accepted into civilian universities were required to serve nine months on active duty prior to matriculation or to take instruction from the military faculty and become reserve officers after graduation. The demographic strain of universal male military conscription on the national labor pool, however, forced the Ceaușescu regime to cut the armed forces by 10,000 soldiers in 1987. Also because of demographic trends, by 1989 women had achieved a small, but increasingly visible, role in the armed forces.

According to Article 36 of the 1965 Constitution, defense of the country is the duty of all citizens, and military service is obligatory, but only men were subject to induction into the armed forces. Young men generally accepted compulsory military service as a reality of life in Romania. There were no provisions for conscientious objection and no alternatives to military service. Conscientious objectors had traditionally been subject to harsh treatment

by political authorities. Seventh Day Adventists who refused to serve in the army during the 1930s were imprisoned. During World War II, citizens who refused military service were charged with treason and summarily executed. In the late 1960s, small numbers of Nazarenes were arrested for objecting to compulsory military service. In 1989, however, authorities granted limited numbers of deferments from service in extreme cases of family hardship or illness and granted, as well, some educational exemptions. Still Romania lacked the organized movement of youths opposing military service that had developed in several non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in the 1980s.

### ***Military Training***

The 1972 Law on the Organization of National Defense mandated universal premilitary training for Romanian youths. Each year more than 650,000 young men and women between ten and twenty years of age received basic military training at schools and work. They were organized into what were called Youth Homeland Defense detachments. In the summer, they attended 200 ground forces, 40 air force, and 15 navy training camps located throughout the country. During several weeks of training camp, they wore the blue uniform of the Patriotic Guards. The Ministry of National Defense, the Patriotic Guards, and the UTC supplied the military equipment and instructors for premilitary training. The program sought to compensate for short service terms by preparing young men for service in the armed forces. Young women used their premilitary training in later service with the Patriotic Guards. A major objective of premilitary training was to inculcate youths with socialist, and especially nationalist, values. In addition, Youth Homeland Defense detachments could be deployed for certain missions and duties if needed in wartime.

After induction into the armed forces, the basic training cycle for conscripts was similar to that in most of the world's armies. It started with individual physical conditioning, close-order drill, small-arms firing, and fundamental small-unit tactics, followed by training in more complex equipment and crew-served weapons and the assignment of a military specialty, and appropriate training in it, after several months. Approximately 20 to 30 percent of basic military training time for conscripts was devoted to political indoctrination. The emphasis on political education among soldiers was evident in the fact that the large majority of them were UTC members. More than 70 percent of the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the armed forces were members of the PCR. At the time of induction, the most qualified conscripts were made NCOs

in return for extending their service beyond the normal sixteen-month or two-year term. Nevertheless, the short service term in the armed forces made the training and retention of competent NCOs a chronic problem.

In 1989 daily existence for soldiers was harder than for most citizens. The daily dietary allowance for soldiers was 2,700 calories, which consisted mainly of bread and small quantities of meat in stews and soups. Dairy products and fruit were generally absent from the military diet because they were in short supply even in the civilian sector. Military units cultivated gardens and raised animals for slaughter to supplement their rations. In many instances, however, this home-grown produce and meat was sold for cash on the black market.

### ***Officer Education***

In 1989 officers in the armed forces received higher than average salaries and extensive benefits such as priority housing. They had relatively high social standing and prestige. Officers still enjoyed fewer perquisites and privileges than their counterparts in the other Warsaw Pact countries, however. Yet the officer's profession remained a path of upward mobility, especially for young men from remote *județe* and agricultural communities.

In 1989 there were several ways of earning a commission in the armed forces. Romania had a number of military secondary schools for officer training in cities and larger towns. After passing a competitive admission examination, cadets could enter a military secondary school at the start of their ninth year of formal education or after completing their terms of service as conscripts. Military secondary schools offered a three- or four-year curriculum of mathematics, physics, chemistry, applied science and engineering, geography, foreign languages, physical conditioning, and sports. Many, like the Alexandru Ioan Cuza Naval Secondary School or the Nicolae Balcescu Military Officers College, were named for heroic military leaders from Romanian history. Military secondary schools began accepting women for training as communications, chemical defense, transportation, air defense, quartermaster corps, medical, and topographic officers in 1973.

In 1989 approximately 70 percent of the second lieutenants on active duty had received commissions by graduating from military secondary schools. While on active duty, approximately 50 percent of all officers continued their professional training by developing a military specialty in resident or correspondence courses at schools for armor in Pitești, infantry in Bacău, artillery in Ploiești, missiles in Brașov, military engineering in Lugoj in *Timiș județ*,



*Soldiers from the military academy at Alba Iulia  
Courtesy Scott Edelman*

and communications in Bucharest. The other 30 percent of officers on active duty received commissions after completing university-level courses of study at more elite institutions.

The General Military Academy and the Military Technical Academy, both located in Bucharest, were the most prestigious military educational establishments. An army general, usually senior in rank and experience to the minister of national defense, headed the General Military Academy. The four-year courses of study at the military academies, concentrating on general military science, military engineering, or party work and organization, led to a university degree as well as a commission as a junior officer. Also located in Bucharest, the Aurel Vlaicu Military Academy for Aviation Officers, named for the founder of Romania's prewar aircraft industry, and the military faculty of the University of Bucharest also produced commissioned graduates.

As captains, navy lieutenants, and majors, promising officers applied to attend two- to five-year advanced command and staff courses at the General Military Academy. Until the early 1960s, mid-career officers were assigned to elite Soviet military academies for higher professional education similar to that provided in war colleges in the United States and other Western countries. Graduation from either the Soviet General Staff Academy or Frunze Military Academy was almost a prerequisite for advancement to general

officer rank and a requirement to become minister of national defense in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. When Romania began to follow a course of greater independence within the Warsaw Pact, however, it stopped sending its officers to the Soviet Union for training. This reduced the chance that Romanian officers would develop a loyalty toward their Soviet counterparts stronger than that to Ceaușescu, the PCR, and the Romanian government. It also largely eliminated opportunities for the Soviet Union to recruit spies from among the Romanian officer corps. At a more practical level, the military had to train its own officers to fight according to a military doctrine and strategy different from that of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

### ***Reserves and Mobilization***

In a concession to the need for economy, the ground forces maintained only one motorized rifle and one tank division at near-full strength in personnel, weapons, and equipment (category one) in 1989. One tank and three motorized rifle divisions were held at 50 to 75 percent of their wartime strength (category two); four motorized rifle divisions were kept at less than 50 percent of complete readiness (category three). Romania also relied heavily on large reserve and paramilitary forces that could be equipped and trained at less cost than could regular forces and could mobilize rapidly in a condition of imminent hostilities.

In 1989 approximately 4.5 million men, or approximately 20 percent of the country's total population, were in the reserve military service age-group of 18 to 50 years. More than 550,000 of these people had served on active duty in the armed forces during the previous five years. They were subject to periodic recall for refresher training in weapons and small unit tactics.

In addition to its system of reserve service, Romania had the Patriotic Guards, which were staffed by about 700,000 citizens, both men and women. In keeping with the doctrine of War of the Entire People, the Patriotic Guards were a combined territorial defense or national guard and civil defense organization, which was established immediately after the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Patriotic Guards worked closely with the Ministry of National Defense but were directly subordinate to the PCR and the UTC. Relying more on ordinary citizens than on the professional military, the Patriotic Guards served as a potential counterweight to or check on the power and influence of the regular armed forces.

In 1989 the Patriotic Guards were organized into company- and platoon-sized units in almost every *judet*, municipality, town, village,

and industrial or agricultural enterprise. Under the command of the first secretary of the local PCR apparatus, they conducted basic and refresher training in small-arms handling, demolition, mortar and grenade-launcher firing, and small-unit tactics. In wartime they had responsibility for local antiaircraft defense, providing early warning of air attack, defending population centers and important elements of national infrastructure, and conducting civil engineering work as needed to reestablish essential military production after an attack. They would reconnoiter and attack enemy flanks and rear areas, combat airborne units and special forces penetrating deep into Romania, and mount resistance operations against occupying forces. In keeping with their guerrilla image, the Patriotic Guards wore plain uniforms with no insignia or badges of rank.

### ***Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia***

As a Warsaw Pact member, Romania adopted armed forces uniforms and insignia modeled on those of the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, however, there was a gradual movement away from the Soviet model and a partial return to the pre-World War II army accoutrements, including the steel helmet formerly known as the "Dutch helmet" and the national crest on head gear, belt buckles, and sleeve patches.

In 1989 the armed forces used four categories of uniforms: full dress, dress, service, and field. The full dress uniform was worn for formal occasions such as parades, ceremonies commemorating Armed Forces Day (October 25), Navy Day (the first Sunday in August), Air Force Day (the third Sunday in July), and Border Guards Day (June 25); conferral of promotions in rank or military decorations; and official receptions. The dress uniform was worn during off-duty hours or during classes at higher military schools. The service uniform was for duty in garrison, and the field uniform was used during training, maneuvers, and firing exercises. The color of the basic uniform for the ground and air force was olive drab, and for the navy it was blue.

Officers wore blue full dress and dress uniforms, which consisted of a single-breasted, open-collar service jacket; matching trousers with a red stripe; black, low quarter shoes or high riding boots; and a service hat. Officers participating with a troop formation in a parade wore the olive drab uniform with a cotton khaki shirt and olive drab tie, a steel helmet, an ornate gold pistol belt, brown gloves, breeches, and high riding boots. Officers in the reviewing stand had the option of wearing the blue uniform with long trousers, black low quarter shoes, the service hat, a white shirt and

black tie, white gloves, and a ceremonial dirk or the olive drab uniform but with a service hat, a white shirt and olive drab tie, and white gloves. The dress uniform for officers was either blue or olive drab with long trousers and low quarter shoes but without the ornate pistol belt and ceremonial dirk. In winter the olive drab uniform was worn with a double-breasted overcoat and brown gloves. Enlisted personnel and noncommissioned ranks wore an olive drab shirt and trousers, a brown leather belt with brass buckle, a garrison cap, and black combat boots. In winter they wore an olive drab overcoat and a pile cap.

The service uniform was the same as the dress olive drab uniform except that officers wore a brown leather Sam Browne belt, breeches, and high boots. Enlisted personnel could wear a field jacket as an outer garment with a brown leather belt and brass buckle. The field uniform was the same as the service uniform except that officers wore the field jacket instead of the service jacket with the Sam Browne belt and hard shoulder boards. Enlisted personnel wore the steel helmet in place of the garrison cap. Depending on the season, the overcoat, gloves, and pile cap were worn in the field.

The prominent features that distinguished air force, air defense, and airborne personnel from army personnel were the background color of the shoulder boards, the color of the collar tabs, and the color of the service hat band. Reminiscent of the pre-World War II era, general and field-grade air force officers wore a series of gold braids topped by a diamond on their sleeves. Members of the elite mountain-troop units wore distinctive olive drab ski pants, field jackets, ski/mountain boots, thick white socks rolled over the boot tops, and olive drab berets. For field training, reconnaissance unit personnel wore a mottled green and brown camouflage jumpsuit with attached head cover in summer and a white uniform in winter. Navy personnel wore uniforms similar in color and style to those used by most of the world's navies. The winter uniform was navy blue, and the summer uniform featured a tropical white service jacket. Enlisted seamen wore a visorless hat with a black band and a hat ribbon worn in pigtail fashion.

In 1989, Romanian military rank structure conformed to that used by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations. There were four general officer ranks, three field-grade ranks, and four company-grade ranks. Enlisted ranks included privates and non-commissioned officers. The naval rank structure was analogous, but there were only three admiral ranks.

All rank insignia was displayed on shoulder loops or shoulder boards and tended to be ornate for commissioned officers and plain for enlisted personnel. General officers wore a shoulder board with

a red background and a broad ornate gold stripe and silver stars set on a red background. The shoulder board worn by air force general officers had a blue background, whereas that worn by navy admirals featured a navy blue background and gold stars. Field-grade officers wore a shoulder board with three longitudinal gold stripes on a background of the color designated for the branch of service and smaller silver stars. For company-grade officers, the shoulder board had two longitudinal gold stripes and even smaller silver stars. The shoulder boards of enlisted and noncommissioned officer ranks featured transverse gold stripes on a background of olive drab or the color designated for the branch of service along with a branch-of-service metallic insignia. Navy officers wore gold sleeve stripes and stars, and the lowest enlisted seamen wore gold chevrons on the sleeve (see fig. 10; fig. 11).

### **The Military and the National Economy**

The Ceaușescu regime pursued a policy designed to ensure that the armed forces would not become an unacceptable burden on the economy. In fact, the armed forces during the 1970s and 1980s made important economic contributions, providing cheap labor and managerial cadres. As economic problems mounted in the mid-1980s, the government curtailed military spending and broadened the use of the armed forces in the civilian economy. At the same time, the arms industry earned badly needed hard currency through weapons and matériel exports.

#### ***Military Budget***

After five years of sustained military budget increases in the early 1980s, the Ceaușescu regime reduced military expenditures by 4.8 percent in the 1986 state budget. At his instruction, the GNA passed an additional 5 percent cut in military spending and the size of the armed forces. It also adopted a change in the 1965 Constitution to hold a national referendum to confirm or to reject this reduction. Young Romanians aged fourteen to eighteen, who were likely to favor any cut that might decrease their chances of induction into military service, were allowed to vote on the referendum. On November 23, 1986, in balloting typical of that during Ceaușescu's rule, a reported 99.9 percent of all eligible citizens turned out and voted unanimously in favor of the 5 percent reduction. This electoral ploy may have enabled Ceaușescu to overcome more easily the apparent opposition to the plan among the professional military.

Implementing the decision made in the November referendum, Romania cut its 1987 military expenditures by US\$156 million to US\$1.171 billion, an actual reduction of more than 11 percent.

ROMANIAN RANK	SUB-LOCOTENENT	LOCOTENENT MAJOR	CĂPITAN	MAJOR	LOCOTENENT COLONEL	COLONEL	GENERAL MAIOR	GENERAL LOCOTENENT	GENERAL COLONEL	GENERAL DE ARMATA
<b>ARMY</b>										
U.S. RANK TITLES	2D LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL
<b>ROMANIAN RANK</b>	SUB-LOCOTENENT	LOCOTENENT MAJOR	CĂPITAN	MAIOR	LOCOTENENT COLONEL	COLONEL	GENERAL MAIOR	GENERAL LOCOTENENT	GENERAL COLONEL	
<b>AIR FORCE</b>										
U.S. RANK TITLES	2D LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	
<b>ROMANIAN RANK</b>	SUB-LOCOTENENT	LOCOTENENT MAJOR	CĂPITAN LOCOTENENT	CĂPITAN RANGUL III	CĂPITAN RANGUL II	CĂPITAN RANGUL I	CONTRA AMIRAL	VICE AMIRAL	AMIRAL	
<b>NAVY</b>										
U.S. RANK TITLES	ENSIGN	LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE	LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER	COMMANDER	CAPTAIN	COMMODORE ADMIRAL	REAR ADMIRAL	VICE ADMIRAL	

Figure 10. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1989

ROMANIAN RANK	SOLDAT	SOLDAT FRUNTAȘ	CAPORAL	SERGEANT	SERGEANT MAJOR	PLUTONIER	PLUTONIER MAJOR	PLUTONIER ADJUTANT
<b>ARMY</b>								
U.S. RANK TITLES	BASIC PRIVATE	PRIVATE PRIVATE 1ST CLASS	CORPORAL	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	SERGEANT 1ST CLASS	MASTER SERGEANT	COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
<b>ROMANIAN RANK</b>	SOLDAT	SOLDAT FRUNTAȘ	CAPORAL	SERGEANT	SERGEANT MAJOR	PLUTONIER	PLUTONIER MAJOR	PLUTONIER ADJUTANT
<b>AIR FORCE</b>								
U.S. RANK TITLES	AIRMAN BASIC	AIRMAN AIRMAN 1ST CLASS	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	TECHNICAL SERGEANT	MASTER SERGEANT	SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT	CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT
<b>ROMANIAN RANK</b>	SOLDAT	SOLDAT FRUNTAȘ	CAPORAL	SERGEANT	SERGEANT MAJOR	PLUTONIER	PLUTONIER MAJOR	PLUTONIER ADJUTANT
<b>NAVY</b>	NO INSIGNIA							
U.S. RANK TITLES	SEAMAN RECRUIT	SEAMAN APPRENTICE SEAMAN	PETTY OFFICER 3D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 2D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS	CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	FLEET FORCE MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

Figure 11. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1989

Active units discharged 10,000 soldiers and mothballed 250 tanks and armored vehicles, 150 artillery pieces, and 25 aircraft. Deteriorating economic conditions and a chronic labor shortage in the mid-1980s probably necessitated the cut in military spending and the force reductions that accompanied it. Nevertheless, a genuine commitment to disarmament—and its attendant potential for enhancing Romania's security—and desire to demonstrate this commitment cannot be entirely discounted as a factor behind the unilateral reductions.

### ***Arms Production***

In 1989 the Soviet Union still provided the majority of heavy arms and complex equipment in Romania's inventory. In the preceding two decades, however, Romania had made considerable progress toward building an independent domestic arms industry. At the PCR Central Committee plenum in April 1968, Ceaușescu officially made development of a domestic arms industry a national priority. He recognized the inherent vulnerability in Romania's reliance on the Soviet Union, a potential adversary, as its principal arms supplier. Ceaușescu claimed that Romania in 1985 was producing more than two-thirds of the weapons and military equipment essential for the country's defense.

At first Romania concentrated on developing its capabilities in low-technology areas, producing spare parts for, repairing, and modifying Soviet-made weapons and equipment for the ground forces. By the early 1980s, Romania had a large-scale program of naval construction and had reestablished its prewar aviation industry. It built minor surface combatants and fighter aircraft using its own designs and produced more complicated units under licensing arrangements with the Soviet Union and other countries. Several Western countries assisted Romanian arms production efforts as a reward for the country's adopting an independent stance within the Warsaw Pact. Besides contributing to its increased independence of the Soviet Union, domestic arms production also increased Romania's exports and became a source of hard currency.

Using Soviet designs provided under license, Romania produced a number of armored fighting vehicles for its ground forces. The TAB-72 was a modified version of the Soviet BTR-60 armored personnel carrier, and the TAB-77 was the counterpart of the Soviet BTR-70. The TAB-72 had an improved Romanian-designed turret, upgraded optical equipment and gun sights, and increased elevation angles for its 14.5mm and 7.62mm machine guns for use in an anti-aircraft mode. It featured a better power-to-weight ratio than the BTR-60 and a greater road speed. One TAB-72 variant

used a Soviet 82mm mortar in place of its turret. The TAB-77 had either a Romanian-made turret or mounted six Soviet AT-3/SAGGER antitank guided missiles. The TAB-C was essentially a domestic version of the Soviet BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicle first built in the early 1960s.

The M-77 tank, also known by the designation TR-77, was the first produced in Romania since World War II. It mounted the turret and 100mm gun from the Soviet T-54/T-55 tank but had a Romanian-designed six-roller track and suspension system for improved mobility over rugged terrain. Romania produced towed and truck-mounted Soviet and Czechoslovak B-11, M-51, and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers, as well as DAC-443 light and DAC-665 medium military cargo trucks using a chassis design purchased from a firm in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). These trucks were used as ground forces transports, communications and electronics vans, bridging equipment carriers, and mobile multiple rocket launcher platforms. Romania also manufactured all small arms, ammunition, munitions, mortars, grenade launchers, communications equipment, and some spare parts for more complex weapons used by its ground forces.

### *Naval Construction*

After the early 1970s, the Soviet Union curtailed transfers of naval vessels, and licenses to construct them, to Romania, forcing it to turn to other potential suppliers and develop a domestic program of naval construction. China allowed Romania to build units of two classes of fast attack craft under license. In the late 1970s, Romania began constructing the first of nineteen Huchuan-class boats in the Drobeta-Turnu Severin shipyard and several Shanghai II-class boats in the Mangalia shipyard. At the same time, Romania developed some more original units. It built eighteen eighty-five-ton VB-class armored riverine patrol boats beginning in 1973. Based on their experience in building Chinese boats, Romanian shipbuilders designed and constructed fourteen Epitrop-class hydrofoil fast attack craft in the early 1980s. Romania built thirty VD-class riverine minesweeping boats and several units of the heavily armed Brutar-class riverine patrol boat (see *Naval Forces*, this ch.).

The Soviet Union began to reestablish its earlier role in Romanian shipbuilding in the 1980s, granting licenses to build copies of the Kashin-class guided missile destroyer and Koni-class frigates—the Romanian Muntenia- and Tetal-classes, respectively. Although Romania built the hulls for ships of these classes, the

Soviet Union supplied all armament and electronic equipment needed to outfit them.

### *Aviation Industry*

In the 1960s and 1970s, Romania reestablished its pre-World War II position as one of the few countries with a national aviation industry. The Soviet Union cooperated to an extent but also tried to confine Romania to producing relatively unsophisticated aircraft at a lower level of aviation technology. Romania therefore established extensive ties with several non-Warsaw Pact countries and undertook licensed production of foreign aircraft and coproduction of the IAR-93, the first non-Soviet combat aircraft ever built and flown in the air force of a Warsaw Pact member state.

Romania had a strong national aviation industry during the interwar years. It produced more than eighty models of aircraft and employed 20,000 engineers, technicians, and other workers. But most of its aircraft production capability was destroyed in bombing raids during World War II, and the post-war recovery of the industry proceeded slowly. The Soviet Union forced Romania to convert its remaining capacity to tractor production but eventually allowed it to resume production of motorized gliders and agricultural, utility, scout, and medical evacuation aircraft. Advancing the aviation industry to a higher technological level became a priority when Ceaușescu came to power in 1965.

Romania began producing light military training aircraft in the early 1970s. The first, the IAR-28MA, was developed on the basis of the IS-28M2 motorized glider. In 1974 the first of seventy-five IAR-823 two-seat turboprop primary training aircraft was built for the air force. In 1978 the Soviet Union granted a license to produce 200 two-seat YaK-52 piston engine trainers annually for the Soviet Air Force. Four years later, Romania began producing the IAR-825TP TRIUMF two-seat turboprop training aircraft for its own air force. In 1986 the Soviet Union awarded Romania production of the single-seat YaK-53 trainer, an upgraded YaK-52. Building Soviet-designed training aircraft, however, did little to increase the technology base of the Romanian aviation industry.

As of 1989, Romania's greatest achievement in the aviation field was the development and production of the IAR-93, a single-seat light fighter aircraft, in collaboration with Yugoslavia. The joint Yugoslav-Romanian (YUROM) program began in 1970, and serial production of the IAR-93 started in 1979. The IAR-93, designed for a close air-support and ground-attack role, was produced in two variants. The thirty IAR-93A aircraft in service with the Romanian Air Force in 1989 had two Rolls-Royce Viper Mk 632 turbojet

engines. The 165 IAR-93B aircraft on order had two afterburner-equipped Mk 633 engines. The IAR-93 had a fully-loaded combat radius of 300 to 400 kilometers. It was armed with two twin-barrel 23mm cannons and carried a maximum bomb load of 1,300 kilograms on four wing pylons and one fuselage attachment point. In conjunction with bringing the IAR-93 into service, Romania developed and built the compatible IAR-99 advanced jet trainer at Craiova in the 1980s.

In the mid-1970s, the Romanian state aviation firm, Industria Aeronautica Română (IAR), began building the first of 200 Alouette III and 100 Puma helicopters on a license from the French firm Aerospatiale, under the designations IAR-316B and IAR-330, respectively. The air force operated the IAR-316B and IAR-330 as armed transports in support of the ground forces. They had pylons for four AT-3/SAGGER antitank guided missiles or sixteen 57mm rockets.

### ***Military Labor***

The government traditionally relied on the military as a reserve labor force for gathering harvests and building railroads. In the 1980s, however, the armed forces became increasingly involved in other areas of the civilian economy. The use of military units in the civilian sector was practically a necessity in view of Romania's severe economic difficulties. To alleviate the chronic labor shortage and to overcome occasional labor unrest and other disruptions, the regime used the military as a corps of engineers on 170 important public construction projects. During the mid-1980s, military commanders and troops were deployed in power plants and energy-related industries to maintain order and to ensure the regime's control over the critical energy sector (see Energy, ch. 3).

In 1988 Ceaușescu stated that 50 percent of active duty military personnel worked on civilian projects at some point during their service. Troops worked on the Bucharest-Danube Canal, the Agigea Lock on the Danube-Black Sea Canal, the bridge over the Danube between Fetești and Cernavodă, the Constanța-Mangalia railroad, the Iron Gates II hydroelectric plant, the Bucharest subway, the Palace of the Republic, and the Ministry of National Defense building. Troops worked almost continuously on irrigation, land reclamation, and reforestation projects.

### **Foreign Military Relations**

Until the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Romania had few military ties to countries outside the Warsaw Pact. After 1968 Romania looked toward the West, China,

and Third World countries for military cooperation in all areas. It developed additional sources of arms supplies, besides the Soviet Union, to meet its requirements for national defense; ensured itself diverse political support in the event of an attack or invasion; and developed markets for its arms exports. Political and military officials modeled Romania's new military doctrine on that of Yugoslavia and coordinated defense plans with its independent neighbor. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Romania pursued an active program of military cooperation with China, including licensed production of fast attack craft in its shipyards and exchanges of high-level military delegations. Romania's military ties to China, which challenged Soviet leadership of the communist world, were particularly irritating to the Soviet Union. Romania also expanded its cooperation in defense matters with neutral European countries including Austria and Switzerland. It reportedly trained Nicaraguan military pilots in the early 1980s. In October 1986, the minister of national defense visited the United States secretary of defense in Washington. Romania also had a program of reciprocal warship port visits with the United States, Britain, and France.

### *The Warsaw Pact*

In the late 1950s, Romania curbed excessive Soviet influence over its armed forces, built up in the years after World War II, and ceased sending its officers to the Soviet Union for military education and training. After 1962 it did not allow Warsaw Pact troop maneuvers on its territory, although occasional command and staff exercises were permitted. In November 1964, PCR General Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej announced a unilateral reduction in the term of compulsory military service from two years to sixteen months and in the size of the Romanian armed forces from 240,000 to 200,000 soldiers. His successor, Ceaușescu, openly asserted that these moves reflected the precedence of Romanian national interests over Warsaw Pact requirements. He criticized Soviet domination of the alliance, its command, and policy making, and he called for structural changes in the Warsaw Pact, to include rotating the position of commander-in-chief of the joint armed forces among non-Soviet officers and allowing the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact member states a bigger role in decision making. In the late 1960s, Romanian forces essentially quit participating in joint Warsaw Pact field exercises except for sending staff officers to observe them, and Ceaușescu announced that Romania would no longer put its military forces under the Warsaw Pact's joint command, even during peacetime maneuvers.

In the midst of the 1968 “Prague Spring” crisis over internal political liberalization in Czechoslovakia, Ceaușescu traveled to Prague to demonstrate his support for party First Secretary Alexander Dubček and Czechoslovak autonomy. Romania declined to join the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia or to allow Bulgarian forces to cross its territory to intervene in Czechoslovakia. At a massive demonstration in Bucharest on the day after the invasion, Ceaușescu denounced the intervention as a violation of Czechoslovakia’s national sovereignty, international law, and the terms of the Warsaw Pact itself. He declared that, unlike Czechoslovakia, Romania would resist a similar invasion of its territory, and he placed Romanian forces on alert status. He established the paramilitary Patriotic Guards with an initial strength of 100,000 citizens to provide a mechanism for the participation of the country’s population in a system of total national defense. Later in August, major troop movements along Romania’s borders with the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria indicated a similar threat of intervention in Romania. These threatening movements may have been intended to intimidate Ceaușescu, who was conferring with Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito at the time.

Determined to prevent alliance maneuvers from serving as a vehicle for intervention in Romania, Ceaușescu refused to allow Warsaw Pact exercises on Romanian territory in the wake of the 1968 action against Czechoslovakia. After its deviation from the common alliance line on Czechoslovakia, Romania became the object of several joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers conducted near its borders that were designed to pressure it politically. These exercises coincided with other major displays of Romanian independence from the Warsaw Pact.

Shortly before Ceaușescu visited China in June 1971, the Soviet Union mounted a major exercise on its southern border with Romania. During “South-71,” as the exercise was called, the Soviet Union mobilized twelve ground forces divisions, and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet operated off the Romanian coast. It requested, but Romania denied, permission to transport three divisions across Romania to Bulgaria for the maneuvers. South-71 was an indication of Soviet displeasure with Ceaușescu for making the first visit to China by a Warsaw Pact head of state since the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s and for maintaining good relations with its communist rival. South-71 forced Romania into a partial mobilization but did not disrupt Ceaușescu’s trip to China. Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Hungarian units conducted the “Opal-71” exercises along Hungary’s border with Romania in August 1971. Ceaușescu’s failure to travel to the Crimea for a summer meeting with Soviet leader

Leonid Brezhnev, customary for East European leaders, may have been related to the military activity along Romania's borders.

Throughout the remainder of the 1970s and during the 1980s, Romania continued and further developed its autonomous position in the Warsaw Pact. It refused to allow Soviet forces to traverse Romanian territory to Bulgaria for joint Warsaw Pact maneuvers. In 1974 Romania denied a Soviet request to construct a broad-gauge railroad from Odessa across eastern Romania to Varna, Bulgaria, that could be used to transport major troop units. Romania's stance against the use of its territory by allied forces effectively isolated Bulgaria from the other Warsaw Pact countries except by air or sea transport.

Romania continued to participate fully in formal alliance political meetings in which it could publicly express its views, assert its interests, and influence the formulation of official Warsaw Pact statements and documents. It openly adopted positions different from those of the Soviet Union. Romanian demands for genuine consultation and greater Eastern European input into decision making resulted in the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1976 and other formal deliberative bodies within the Warsaw Pact. Romania used these consultative mechanisms to publicize its disagreements with the Soviet Union over alliance policy. In 1978 it publicly opposed Soviet initiatives to achieve tighter military integration in the Warsaw Pact and to increase the military expenditures of the Warsaw Pact member states. In 1980 Romania refused to support the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when it abstained instead of voting against the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the Soviet action. It later openly called on the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. In 1984 Romania publicly opposed the Soviet decision to deploy short-range ballistic missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia to counter the 1983 NATO deployment of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in Western Europe.

Romania remained a Warsaw Pact member state in 1989, but retained its well-established reputation as a maverick within the Soviet alliance. It maximized its autonomy within the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact, minimized its participation, and avoided an outright withdrawal from the alliance, which the Soviet Union would not have tolerated. The Soviet Union countenanced these displays of independence because, as part of the Warsaw Pact's southern tier, Romania had a less strategic location than East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary; it did not border on a NATO country; and it retained its rigid internal communist regime.

### *Arms Sales*

Romania produced Soviet weapons and military equipment under license not only for its own armed forces, but also for export to the Soviet Union and to both Soviet-allied and nonaligned countries in the Middle East and Africa. In the early 1980s, annual arms transfers abroad averaged US\$620 million, or between 5 and 6 percent of total exports, making Romania the world's ninth largest arms exporter and second only to Czechoslovakia among the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.

The Ministry of National Defense's foreign trade division and the state-owned firm Romtehnica handled Romania's arms sales abroad. The majority of its sales of Soviet-designed AK-47 and AKM assault rifles, BM-21 and M-51 multiple rocket launchers, TAB-72 armored personnel carriers, and munitions and ordnance went to the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Iraq, Libya, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) during the early 1980s. In 1983 Romania and Libya signed a formal military cooperation agreement based on the supply of Romanian-made infantry arms, military vehicles, and explosives to the latter. Iraq remained Romania's best Middle East customer. Besides selling arms, Romania repaired and overhauled Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles that had been damaged in the battles of the Iran-Iraq War.

In 1984 Romania agreed to sell 200 M-77 tanks, its improved version of the Soviet T-55, to Egypt as well as to provide training and maintenance and to assist Egypt in undertaking licensed production of the M-77. Romania exported spare parts—produced under license—for French Alouette III and Puma helicopters in service with the air forces of Algeria, Angola, and Ethiopia. It tried unsuccessfully to sell its versions of the French-designed helicopters, IAR-316B and IAR-330, in Latin America in competition with the original manufacturer Aerospatiale.

For Romania, arms sales represented a stable export market that helped to absorb some underutilized productive capacity in its heavy manufacturing sector and to earn hard currency until the mid-1980s. Arms transfers to the Soviet Union allowed Romania to reduce somewhat its trade imbalance with that country. Trading weapons for oil with countries in the Middle East enabled Romania to develop a non-Soviet source of energy supplies. After several years of steady increases, however, arms sales abroad dropped to US\$270 million in 1986. Arms production and sales became a less valuable part of the economy in the late 1980s and even became a burden on the civilian sector.

## **Law and Order**

The PCR and the Ceaușescu regime placed a far greater emphasis on order than on the rule of law. The Constitution of 1965 was superficially similar to the constitutions of Western democracies, but a tremendous gap existed between the rights stipulated in it and the human rights and civil liberties respected by the party and state. As a result, Romania earned the reputation as being the most repressive state in Eastern Europe. Although abuses were perpetrated by the Ministry of Interior and its Department of State Security, the Ministry of Justice and the judicial system were either unable or unwilling to prevent them.

The 1965 Constitution theoretically guaranteed equal rights for all citizens regardless of ethnic origin or religious belief (Article 17); freedom of association (Article 27); freedom of speech (Article 28); freedom of conscience and religious belief (Article 30); as well as the inviolability of the person (Article 31), the domicile (Article 32), and correspondence and communications (Article 33). However, the Constitution also stipulated that no citizen may exercise these rights when they conflict with the "socialist order" or serve aims "hostile to the interests of the Romanian working people." Because the PCR alone defined the interests of the working people, no Romanian was able to exercise his or her rights to challenge the rule of the PCR and Ceaușescu. The rights of the citizenry were not inalienable; they were given by the party and as such could be taken away.

## **Judicial System**

The Ministry of Justice was responsible for the administration of justice and the maintenance of law and order. Under the Constitution, it was charged with defending the socialist order, protecting individual rights, and reeducating those who violate the country's laws, in that order of precedence. The Ministry of Justice exercised its authority through its main component, the Office of the Prosecutor General (Procuratura), which was established in 1952. The Procuratura operated the court system, decided jurisdictional questions, and compiled statistics on crime. It also oversaw the central criminology institute and forensic science laboratory.

Although the judicial system was theoretically independent, the PCR controlled it through its power to appoint judges and through the rules of party discipline. The judicial system took its orders directly from the Ministry of Interior and the security service. As a result, the government has never failed to win a conviction, according to Romanian dissidents. The GNA possessed formal

authority to appoint the prosecutor general (attorney general) for a five-year term, and he was theoretically responsible only to it, or to the Council of State when the former was not in session. The prosecutor general represented the interests of the party and government in all legal disputes. He could petition the Supreme Court for interpretations of existing laws or propose changes in criminal statutes or new legislation to the GNA. He also appointed lower-level prosecutors in the *judete*. The Procuratura was supposed to investigate and resolve any charges that the Ministry of Interior or the security service had acted illegally or improperly. Yet the latter operated virtually unchecked in the late 1980s, following only directives issued by Ceaușescu and the PCR. Below the national level, the Procuratura was organized in the forty *judete*, the municipality of Bucharest, and smaller localities. Its prosecutors had greater latitude to issue arrest warrants, review evidence, monitor investigations, arraign suspects, and file suits than did prosecutors in most legal systems.

### Courts

The court system was organized at national, *judet*, and local levels. It operated for a long time under the 1947 Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, which placed many professional judicial functions in the hands of ordinary citizens, who were selected and instructed by the PCR. The 1947 law put two lay judges alongside one professional jurist on 16,000 local judicial commissions that heard cases involving labor disputes, civil complaints, family law, and minor crimes and violations of public order. A judicial reform implemented in 1978 established panels of between three and seven “popular” judges, recruited from the masses of workers and peasants, to serve as local working people’s judicial councils for two-year terms. These judges were appointed by and responded to local PCR committees or people’s councils, the UTC, official trade unions, and other PCR-controlled mass organizations.

Operating in small municipalities, towns, and large industrial and agricultural enterprises, working people’s judicial councils played a significant role in dispensing justice. They handled up to 50 percent of all court cases. The management of a work unit investigated and presented the facts of a case, and a co-worker defended the accused. Unlike the larger municipal, *judet*, and military courts over which professional judges presided, working people’s judicial councils could impose only light sentences short of prison terms. Nevertheless, whether filled by a professional or an ordinary citizen, the judge’s bench in Romania was subject to

virtually irresistible pressure to decide cases according to the PCR's political preferences.

### ***Military Courts***

The civilian prosecutor general appointed the military prosecutor with concurrence of the minister of national defense. The military Procuratura operated an extensive system of courts, which tried military personnel for violations of the military oath and regulations and held courts-martial for certain offenses. Military courts also exercised original jurisdiction over cases involving civilian offenses committed by those in the military services. More unusually, they heard cases of transgressions against the socialist order or the security of the state in both peacetime and wartime regardless of whether the accused was military or civilian. Cases brought before military courts were tried in closed session with even less concern for due process and the rights of the accused than was shown in civilian courtrooms. The use of secret proceedings reduced the chances of negative international publicity for the PCR and the Ceaușescu regime that could result from open trials of alleged criminals.

### ***Penal Code***

Romania introduced its new Penal Code in 1978. It was somewhat less draconian than the two previous penal codes promulgated during the early period of communist rule, in 1948 and 1968. The new code had a major impact on crime and punishment. It reduced the overall number of indictable offenses, introduced lighter sentences, and established a more flexible approach toward the treatment of offenders, juvenile offenders in particular. It mandated rehabilitation instead of prison sentences in many cases.

The greater emphasis on socialist legality, or the rule of law over adherence to the political dictates of the PCR evident in the 1978 penal code, did little to change the PCR's attitude toward the phenomenon of political crime. Although officials denied it, estimates indicated that as many as thirty prisoners remained incarcerated for political "crimes" after the government's January 1988 amnesty. Human rights groups reported that this estimate represented only a fraction of the total number of cases, as many more prisoners with political motivation had been convicted of common crimes or of attempting to leave the country illegally. Political prisoners were customarily tried and convicted in military courts. Articles 166 and 167 of the Penal Code were used to charge Romanian dissidents as criminals for calling on the regime to respect the civil and human rights outlined in the Constitution or for granting

interviews to foreign reporters to discuss the regime's repressive nature (see *Dissidence*, this ch.). They could receive sentences of from five to fifteen years for disseminating "propaganda against the socialist order," for "any action aimed at changing the socialist order or from which a danger to the security of the state may result," or for "slandering the state."

Under the 1978 Penal Code, a system of release on bail for those accused of minor crimes was established. Previously bail was granted only to foreigners, who were required to post it in hard currency. First offenders were punished by disciplinary or administrative actions and court-ordered fines. Courts could order corrective labor under the supervision of a specific industrial or agricultural enterprise and mandate an automatic 15 to 20 percent reduction in the salary of an offender. For other misdemeanors, the courts could order an offender to be placed on probation under police (militia) supervision for up to five years. Minors between fourteen and twenty-one years of age were tried by a collective comprising the leaders of the school or enterprise where they studied or worked, UTC representatives, and a judge or other representative of the local procuratura. As a rule, convicted juveniles served a term of supervised labor in correctional homes called "special training institutes." Only minors with a prior record of offenses could be sentenced to a prison term, and they were supposed to be segregated from older inmates. The 1978 Penal Code reduced the number of offenses punishable by death from twenty-eight under the 1968 penal code to just a few serious crimes including first-degree murder, air piracy, treason, and espionage. It imposed a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison for all offenses. Misdemeanors were expunged from the 1978 Penal Code and formed into a separate Code on Minor Violations of the Law, leaving only felony offenses in the Penal Code.

Beginning in the 1970s, the Council of State announced an amnesty program approximately every other year. Generally, prisoners serving less than three years or with less than three years remaining on longer sentences were freed, and the sentences of prisoners serving more than three years were reduced. The government reportedly released 90 percent of those in prison or awaiting trial through an amnesty announced in January 1988. Amnesties may have been intended to alleviate chronic labor shortages or to clear prisons crowded by strict law enforcement.

## **Crime**

The PCR asserted that the socioeconomic change wrought under communist rule reduced crime committed against individuals

and property. According to the PCR, the socialist system eliminated the root cause of lawlessness—economic inequality—and therefore crime was disappearing. Articles in the Romanian press, however, indicated that crime remained a significant, if not growing, problem in 1989. The phenomenon of economic crime was the by-product of Romania's inefficient, overly centralized economy. Unrealistic prices and exchange rates led to widespread corruption, shortages, a black market, speculation, and hoarding. Although the 1978 Penal Code abolished the use of capital punishment against those convicted of economic crimes such as embezzlement or fraud, it stipulated heavy fines and criminal penalties, including a two-year prison term, for failure to conserve resources in socialist industrial and agricultural enterprises. In 1987 courts sentenced 300 citizens for economic crimes or the "illegal acquisition of wealth" and confiscated goods worth 47,000,000 lei (for value of the leu—see Glossary). There were indications that apprehension of economic "criminals" was difficult and that a prosecutorial backlog of such cases existed in 1989.

After the 1988 amnesty, the minister of justice reported that there were 7,500 citizens in prison. There had been 75,000 citizens in jail prior to the amnesty. Although Romania released few statistics on crime, press reports indicated that juvenile crime was a particular problem. In 1981 the UTC revealed that 25,000 youths under the age of twenty-one had been convicted of various offenses.

## **Security and Intelligence Services**

The Ministry of Interior's Department of State Security (Departamentul Securității Statului, popularly known as the Securitate, see Glossary) was the PCR's secret political police. The Department of External Information (Departamentul de Informații Externe—DIE) was the principal foreign intelligence service. These organizations were shrouded in secrecy, but an increasing number of defections from their ranks shed some light on their composition and activities. The Securitate and the DIE were responsible for guarding the internal and external security of the Ceaușescu regime and suppressing any unrest, disturbance, or dissident group that criticized or challenged it. They succeeded in repressing most organized opposition to the regime. Yet spontaneous outbursts of discontent with Ceaușescu's "cult of personality," economic austerity policy, treatment of ethnic minorities, antireligious campaign, and lack of respect for internationally recognized civil and human rights occurred with increasing frequency after the mid-1970s.


Given the deteriorating economic situation and the growth of social unrest in the 1980s, the loyalty of the security and intelligence

services was critical to the political future of the Ceaușescu clan. Observers believed that the services could play a decisive role in the outcome of a future leadership struggle between Ceaușescu, his heirs, and other contenders for power. Despite their treatment as a privileged caste, Securitate and DIE personnel showed signs of dissatisfaction with the regime and the situation in the country during the late 1980s. Poor living conditions were so widespread that even these individuals were affected, creating the potential for sympathy with a largely discontented population.

### Ministry of Interior and Security Forces

The Ministry of Interior was the primary government organization responsible for maintaining order in Romania (see fig. 12). It was one of only three ministries represented in the Defense Council, the highest governmental forum for considering national security issues. It controlled the Securitate, special security troops, and police throughout the country. The ministry's functions ranged widely from identifying and neutralizing foreign espionage and domestic political threats to the Ceaușescu regime to supervising routine police work and local fire departments. The Ministry of Interior was organized into a number of directorates at the national level, and it controlled similar activities at the *județ* and municipal levels. There was a ministry inspectorate general in each *județ* as well as in Bucharest. The inspectorates general in the *județe* had subordinate offices in fifty major cities. They were accountable only to the first secretaries of the *județ* PCR committees and local people's councils as well as the ministry chain of command.

In prewar Romania, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the precursor of the Ministry of Interior) closely supervised the activities of local governments and courts. The PCR gained control of the ministry in 1946 and filled its ranks with party activists, enabling the party to seize power the next year and consolidate communist rule during the following decade. One of the PCR's first actions was to increase the strength of the police from 2,000 to 20,000 officers who were loyal to the party. Little is known about the activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs after the late 1940s except that it was tightly controlled by the PCR general secretary and directly served his interests. In 1972 a deputy minister of internal affairs, General Ion Serb, was arrested and executed for spying on behalf of the Soviet Union. Serb was allegedly recruited by the Soviet Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti—KGB) early in his career during his training in Moscow. The Serb affair led to a purge within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which was renamed the Ministry of Interior, and helped



Source: Based on information from Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief*, Washington, 1987; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *Directory of Romanian Officials*, Washington, 1985.

Figure 12. Organization of the Ministry of Interior, 1980s

Ceașescu establish control over an important lever of power. In a bizarre 1982 affair, Ceașescu again purged the ministry, dismissing scores of officials who allegedly practiced transcendental meditation. Among those who lost their positions was a deputy minister of the interior, Major General Vasile Moise.

In 1989 the directorates of the Securitate were the largest component of the Ministry of Interior. They also comprised Eastern Europe's largest secret police establishment in proportion to total population. The Directorate for Investigations had agents and informants placed in virtually every echelon of the party and government, as well as among the public, to report on the antiregime activities and opinions of ordinary citizens. It perpetrated illegal entries into public offices and private homes and interrogated and arrested people opposed to Ceașescu's rule. Its agents frequently used force to make dissidents provide information on their compatriots and their activities. According to some prominent dissidents, because of the directorate's influence over judges and prosecutors, no dissident arrested by it had ever been acquitted in court. It worked closely with the Directorate for Surveillance and the Directorate for Mail Censorship. The latter monitored the correspondence of dissidents and ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania. Toward this end, it collected handwriting samples from the population and supervised the official registration of all typewriters and copying machines by the police.

The General Directorate for Technical Operations (*Dirrecția Generală de Tehnică Operativă—DGTO*) was an integral part of the Securitate's activities. Established with the assistance of the KGB in the mid-1950s, the DGTO monitored all voice and electronic communications in the country. The DGTO intercepted all telephone, telegraph, and telex communications coming into and going out of the country. It secretly implanted microphones in public buildings and private residences to record ordinary conversations among citizens.

The Directorate for Counterespionage conducted surveillance against foreigners—Soviet nationals in particular—to monitor or impede their contacts with Romanians. It enforced a variety of restrictions preventing foreigners from residing with ordinary citizens, keeping them from gaining access to foreign embassy compounds and requesting asylum, and requiring them to report any contact with foreigners to the Securitate within twenty-four hours. Directorate IV was responsible for similar counterespionage functions within the armed forces, and its primary mission was identifying and neutralizing Soviet penetrations.

Directorate V and the Directorate for Internal Security focused mainly on party and government leadership cadres. Directorate V provided protective services and physical security for Romanian officials. With more than 1,000 agents, the Directorate for Internal Security concentrated on rooting out disloyalty to Ceaușescu within the PCR hierarchy, the Council of Ministers, and the Securitate itself. It was a small-version Securitate in itself, with independent surveillance, mail censorship, and telephone-monitoring capabilities. An additional source of information on attitudes toward the regime within the Securitate was one of Ceaușescu's relatives, who was a lieutenant general in the Ministry of Interior.

The Directorate for Penitentiaries operated Romania's prison system. In 1989 the prisons had a notorious reputation for mistreating inmates. Major prisons were located in Aiud in *Alba județ*, Jilava near Bucharest, Gherla in *Cluj județ*, Rahova, and Drobeta-Turnu Severin, and political prisoners were known to be confined in each of these institutions. Others may have been held in psychiatric hospitals. The Ministry of Interior's Service K exercised wide countersubversion authority in the prison system, beating dissidents, denying them medical attention, implanting microphones, censoring their mail to obtain incriminating evidence against them and their associates, and reportedly even administering lethal doses of toxic substances to political prisoners.

The Directorate for Militia and the Directorate for Security Troops controlled the routine police and paramilitary forces of the Ministry of Interior respectively. The police and security troops selected new recruits from the same annual pool of conscripts that the armed services used. The police performed routine law enforcement functions including traffic control and issuance of internal identification cards to citizens. Organized in the late 1940s to defend the new regime, in 1989 the security troops had 20,000 soldiers. They were an elite, specially trained paramilitary force organized like motorized rifle (infantry) units equipped with small arms, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, but their mission was considerably different.

The security troops were directly responsible through the Minister of the Interior to PCR General Secretary Ceaușescu. They guarded important installations including PCR *județ* and central office buildings and radio and television stations. The Ceaușescu regime presumably could call the security troops into action as a private army to defend itself against a military coup d'état or other domestic challenges and to suppress antiregime riots, demonstrations, or strikes. To ensure their loyalty, security troops were subject to intense political indoctrination and had five times as many political



*Old Braşov town hall, site of November 1987 riots  
Courtesy Scott Edelman*

officers in their ranks as in the armed services. They adhered to stricter discipline than in the regular military, but they were rewarded with a better standard of living.

The National Commission for Visas and Passports controlled travel abroad and emigration. In 1989 travel and emigration were privileges granted by the regime, not civil rights of citizens. As a rule, only trusted party or government officials could travel abroad and were required to report to the Securitate for debriefing upon their return. Prospective emigrants faced many bureaucratic obstacles and harassment at the hands of the Securitate.

Even the Securitate was unable to deter all Romanians from fleeing the country to escape its political repression and economic hardships. An estimated 40,000 Romanians entered Hungary as refugees during 1988 alone (see *Ethnic Structure*, ch. 2). Romanians who applied to emigrate legally were dismissed from their jobs and were unable to find work other than manual labor. They were questioned and had their residences searched and personal belongings seized or were called up for military duty or service in special labor brigades. There were no time deadlines for the government to make decisions on emigration applications and no right of appeal for negative decisions. Even with an exit visa, would-be emigrants confronted corrupt passport and customs officials demanding bribes amounting to US\$3,000 to process necessary paperwork. The government received payment from West Germany and Israel in return for allowing ethnic German and Jewish Romanians to leave the country. Emigrants in these categories represented the vast majority of the 14,000 allowed to emigrate annually during the 1980s.

## **Dissidence**

There were few signs of widespread organized opposition to the Ceaușescu regime in the late 1980s, but scattered and sporadic indications of social and political unrest were increasing. This opposition emanated from political and human rights activists, workers, religious believers, ethnic minority groups, and even former mid-level officials of the PCR. But the ubiquitous Securitate effectively suppressed dissidence because activists were few in number and isolated from one another and from their potential followers.

The Securitate had an effective overall strategy and varied tactics for suppressing dissidence. It relied primarily on extralegal reprisals against leading individual dissidents that ranged from petty harassment, threats, and intimidation to physical beatings at the hands of the plainclothes militia. Dissidents were often fired from their jobs and then prosecuted and imprisoned for “parasitism,”


even though they were frequently denied all opportunities to work. To isolate dissidents from one another and from Western diplomats and media representatives inside Romania who could bring them international attention, the state denied them residence permits that were required by law before they could live in major cities. The state either avoided prosecuting dissidents in open trials that would generate publicity for their causes or prosecuted them in secret trials before military courts (see *Judicial System*, this ch.).

Even if they avoided detention, some well-known dissidents had their telephone and mail service interrupted and were jailed without warning. Several lived under virtual house arrest and constant surveillance by plainclothes Securitate agents and the uniformed militia, who cordoned off their apartments and intimidated potential visitors. Dissidents were often vilified publicly in the media as traitors, imperialist spies, or servants of the ancien régime. When the cases of certain dissidents became known to international human rights organizations and the state was unable to act freely against them, the Securitate pressured these dissidents to emigrate by making their lives unbearable and granting them exit visas to leave the country. Once the dissidents were removed from the domestic political scene, the DIE acted against those who continued their criticism of the Ceaușescu regime while in exile (see *Department of External Information*, this ch.).

Romania's industrial workers became an important source of unrest and a potential threat to the Ceaușescu regime and future PCR rule in the 1970s. During the 1980s, the labor force's restiveness continued, primarily in reaction to the virtual collapse of the national economy and the deteriorating standard of living (see *The Economy*, ch. 3). The regime's economic austerity policy and attendant food, fuel, and power shortages hurt the working class in particular. But Ceaușescu weathered spontaneous, short-lived labor protests with the support of the security forces and police, who prevented the development of a sustained, independent workers' movement in Romania that would be comparable to Poland's Solidarity. Although they never failed to subdue protestors, the Securitate and police appeared to be strained under the burden of monitoring restive workers throughout Romania in the late 1980s.

### **Department of External Information**

The Department of External Information (DIE) was Romania's primary foreign intelligence organization (see fig. 13). It worked closely with the Ministry of Interior, the Securitate, and the general staff's Directorate for Military Intelligence ( *Direcția de Informații*



Source: Based on information from Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Red Horizons: Chronicles of a Communist Spy Chief*, Washington, 1987.

Figure 13. Organization of the Romanian Intelligence Service, 1980s

a Armatei—DIA). The defection of the DIE deputy director, Lieutenant General Ion Pacepa, in 1978 revealed considerable information on its activities abroad for the first time, precipitated a major purge of personnel from the DIE, and contributed to the cooling of relations between Romania and the United States in the 1980s.

The DIE was formed with Soviet assistance in the mid-1950s. Until the early 1960s, Romania sent its intelligence officers to attend a two-year KGB training course in espionage tradecraft near Moscow. In 1964 Romanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej curtailed DIE cooperation with the KGB and established a DIE training center in Broșteni, in Suceava *județ*.

The Directorate for Operations conducted clandestine intelligence collection and other activities outside Romania. Its officers operated under cover throughout the world, collecting political, economic, and technical intelligence for analysis by the Directorate for Foreign Intelligence. Brigade SD had 300 intelligence officers who were assigned primarily to Western countries to conduct technological espionage. It focused on acquiring military-related technology for use in the domestic arms industry and armed forces. According to Pacepa, however, Romania also transferred illegally obtained Western industrial, electronics, nuclear energy, and

data-processing technology to the Soviet Union, under a secret bilateral agreement, in exchange for hard currency.

Within the Directorate for Operations, the Emigré Brigade had intelligence officers who contacted and worked among the 600,000 Romanian émigrés living in the United States, France, and West Germany. Playing on Romanian nationalism, they encouraged former Romanian citizens to cooperate with the DIE in obtaining Western high technology and engendering a favorable image of Romania abroad. The Emigré Brigade also monitored the activities of exiled dissidents who were vocal critics of the Ceaușescu regime and attempted to assassinate selected émigrés in retaliation for their opposition to Ceaușescu.

In 1982 a Romanian agent who was dispatched to kill dissident writers Paul Goma and Virgil Tanase in Paris defected to French authorities before undertaking his mission. This episode severely strained previously close French-Romanian relations. The DIE's primary target abroad, however, was the Munich-based staff of Radio Free Europe's (RFE) Romanian service, many of whom were Romanian émigrés. For many years, RFE's Romanian service had monitored internal developments in Romania and exposed the repressive nature of the Ceaușescu regime. The beating and stabbing of several RFE staff members by unidentified assailants, several death threats, and the deaths from cancer of three successive directors of the Romanian service were attributed by some observers to DIE operations.

Also within the Directorate for Operations, Service D conducted covert operations, including the dissemination of forgeries and disinformation, to promote Romanian national interests and foreign policies. According to Pacepa, Service D's forgeries and disinformation were designed to influence Western countries to reward Romania for its independence of the Soviet Union with economic assistance and trading privileges and to generate political support among Third World countries. Service Z of the Directorate for Operations reportedly maintained ties to non-state entities including guerrilla movements, terrorist groups, and international organized crime.

The Directorate for Technical Equipment was responsible for designing or obtaining specialized espionage equipment required by the DIE. It was reportedly involved in equipping some Romanian trucks to conduct espionage operations in Western Europe. The DIE's National Center for Enciphered Communications had the mission of protecting Romanian government and party communications from Western and Soviet electronic monitoring. In 1989 the ministries of national defense, interior, foreign affairs, and foreign trade relied on

the center's encryption systems in their daily operations at home and abroad.

\* \* \*

The best sources of information on Romanian military history, doctrine, and strategy are Ilie Ceaușescu's *Romanian Military Doctrine* and Ion Coman's *The Romanian National Defense Concept*. They cover the development of the Romanian military establishment from the earliest times until World War II. Romanian writers, however, ignore Soviet-Romanian fighting between 1941 and 1944, as well as Soviet domination of Romania until the late 1950s. John Erickson's two-volume set, *Stalin's War with Germany*, fills this gap. Alex Alexiev's *Romania and the Warsaw Pact* and Aurel Braun's *Romanian Foreign Policy since 1965* provide the best descriptions and analyses of postwar developments in Romania's defense policy and armed forces.

Information on more current developments in the Romanian military establishment can be found in several sources. Radio Free Europe analysts have written extensively on Romanian arms sales, military budget, major command changes, and the professional military establishment's relations with the PCR and General Secretary Ceaușescu.

There are few sources of information on Romania's system of law and order. *Radio Free Europe Research* [Munich] produces highly reliable articles on dissidence in Romania. Lieutenant General Ion Pacepa's *Red Horizons* is a highly interpretive firsthand account of the structure and domestic and foreign activities of Romania's security and intelligence services. He was deputy director of the DIE and a personal adviser to Ceaușescu before defecting in 1978. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

## Appendix

### Table

- 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
- 2 Structure of Investments by Economic Sector, Selected Years, 1951-80
- 3 Projected State Budget Revenues, 1989
- 4 Projected State Budget Expenditures, 1989
- 5 Structure of the Labor Force by Sector, 1950 and 1982
- 6 Trading Partners, 1960, 1970, and 1980
- 7 Foreign Trade by Commodity Group, 1950, 1975, and 1985
- 8 Planned Changes in the Energy Balance, 1980-90
- 9 Growth of the Electric Power Industry, Selected Years, 1950-90
- 10 Membership of the Romanian Communist Party, 1970 and 1988



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters .....	0.04	inches
Centimeters .....	0.39	inches
Meters .....	3.3	feet
Kilometers .....	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m <sup>2</sup> ) .....	2.47	acres
Square kilometers .....	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters .....	35.3	cubic feet
Liters .....	0.26	gallons
Kilograms .....	2.2	pounds
Metric tons .....	0.98	long tons
.....	1.1	short tons
.....	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius .....	9	degrees Fahrenheit
(Centigrade)	divide by 5 and add 32	

Table 2. Structure of Investments by Economic Sector,  
Selected Years, 1951-80  
(in percentages)

Sector	1951-55	1966-70	1976-80
Industry			
Group A (heavy industry) .....	46.7	42.3	42.1
Group B (light industry) .....	7.0	7.6	7.1
Total industry .....	53.7	49.9	49.2
Construction .....	3.6	3.8	5.9
Agriculture and forestry .....	11.3	16.0	13.7
Transportation and communications	10.3	10.2	10.6
Housing .....	10.1	9.4	10.2
Other .....	11.0	10.7	10.4
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Based on information from Michael Shafir, *Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society*, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, 108.

Table 3. Projected State Budget Revenues, 1989  
(in millions of lei)\*

Source of Revenue	Amount
Self-financed state enterprises, cooperatives, and public units	
Profit payments .....	55,220.2
Turnover taxes .....	233,283.0
Taxes on incomes of public units and cooperatives .....	<u>2,658.0</u>
Total .....	291,161.2
Income taxes on the wage fund .....	50,924.0
State social insurance .....	47,275.0
Direct income taxes .....	5,727.4
Taxes on agricultural cooperatives .....	1,590.0
Unexplained sources of revenue .....	26,795.9
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>423,473.5</b>

\* For value of the leu—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from "Legea planului național unic de dezvoltare economico-socială a Republicii Socialiste România pe anul 1989," *Scinteia* [Bucharest], December 2, 1988, 1-2.

Table 4. Projected State Budget Expenditures, 1989  
(in millions of lei)\*

Sector	Amount
Financing the national economy .....	183,373.4
Social and cultural needs .....	107,041.8
Defense .....	11,753.3
Administration, court system .....	4,000.7
Scientific research and development and application of new technologies .....	1,103.0
Expenditures not itemized .....	116,201.3
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>423,473.5</b>

\* For value of the leu—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from "Legea planului național unic de dezvoltare economico-socială a Republicii Socialiste România pe anul 1989," *Scinteia* [Bucharest], December 2, 1988, 1-2.

Table 5. Structure of the Labor Force by Sector, 1950 and 1982  
(in percentages)

Sector	1950	1982
Industry .....	12.0	36.5
Agriculture .....	74.1	28.6
Construction .....	2.2	7.7
Transportation .....	1.9	6.2
Trade .....	2.5	5.9
Municipal services, education, and arts .....	2.3	4.1
Public health .....	1.1	2.8
Science and scientific services .....	0.2	1.1
Telecommunications .....	0.3	0.8
Administration .....	1.7	0.6
Forestry .....	0.2	0.4
Other .....	1.5	5.3
TOTAL .....	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on information from *East European Economic Handbook*, London, 1985, 202.

Table 6. Trading Partners, 1960, 1970, and 1980  
(in percentages)

Type of Partner	1960	1970	1980
Comecon countries .....	66.8	49.0	33.7
Other socialist countries .....	6.2	6.8	6.8
Advanced capitalist countries .....	22.1	35.6	32.8
Developing countries .....	4.6	8.2	25.2
Other countries .....	0.3	0.4	1.5
TOTAL .....	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on information from Michael Shafir, *Romania: Politics, Economics, and Society*, Boulder, Colorado, 1985, 49.

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Table 7. *Foreign Trade by Commodity Group, 1950, 1975, and 1985*  
(in percentages)

Commodity Group	1950		1975		1985	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Fuels, minerals, and metals . . . .	33.8	23.5	22.7	30.4	24.9	51.0
Machinery and equipment . . . . .	4.2	38.3	22.8	40.3	34.7	26.7
Industrial consumer goods . . . . .	1.3	10.2	18.1	5.5	16.9	4.2
Chemical products . . . . .	1.7	4.5	7.0	6.7	9.8	6.4
Other nonfood raw materials . . . .	28.9	21.4	10.2	10.1	4.4	5.6
Foodstuffs . . . . .	14.1	0.3	12.1	3.0	6.3	2.3
Other . . . . .	16.0	1.8	7.1	4.0	3.0	3.8
TOTAL . . . . .	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Based on information from Romania, *Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste România, 1986*, Bucharest, 1987, 294.

Table 8. *Planned Changes in the Energy Balance, 1980 and 1990*  
(in percentages)

Energy Source	1980	1990
Oil and gas . . . . .	40	5
Coal . . . . .	40	44
Hydroelectric . . . . .	18	24
Nuclear . . . . .	0	18
Other . . . . .	2	9
TOTAL . . . . .	100	100

Source: Based on information from Richard F. Staar, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, Stanford, California, 1988, 206.

Table 9. Growth of the Electric Power Industry,  
Selected Years, 1950-90

Year	Installed Capacity (in megawatts)	Output (in gigawatt-hours)
1950 .....	740	2,113
1960 .....	1,779	7,650
1970 .....	11,578	53,721
1980 .....	16,109	67,034
1990 * .....	23,018	n.a.

n.a.—not available.

\* As projected.

Source: Based on information from "Elektroenergetika Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki Rumynii," *Elektricheskie stantsii* [Moscow], No. 11, 1986, 74-75.

Table 10. Membership of the Romanian Communist  
Party, 1970 and 1988

Group	1970		1988	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Workers .....	867,290	43.4	2,042,951	55.1
Peasants .....	531,447	26.6	575,751	15.5
Intelligentsia .....	481,083	24.0	757,157	20.4
Pensioners and housewives .....	119,900	6.0	333,876	9.0
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>1,999,720</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,709,735</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Based on information from Richard F. Staar, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, Stanford, California, 1988, 196.



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(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Jane's Defence Weekly* [London], *International Defense Review*, *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, *Radio Free Europe Research* [Munich], and *Allgemeine Schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift* [Bern].)



## Glossary

- Banat**—Region bounded by the Tisza River on the west, the Mureş River on the north, the Transylvanian Alps on the east, and the Danube on the south. After World War I, it was divided between Yugoslavia and Romania.
- Bessarabia**—Region between the Dniester and Prut rivers north of the Black Sea. Seized by the Soviet Union in 1940, it was merged with Bukovina (*q.v.*) to form the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.
- Bukovina** (var., Bucovina)—Region in the foothills of the Eastern Carpathians at the headwaters of the Prut, Siret, and Dniester rivers. The region belonged to Romania between World War I and World War II, but was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940.
- central* (pl., *centrale*)—Large industrial associations created by economic reforms in the late 1960s ostensibly to assume some of the decision-making authority of the various economic ministries. They had little real autonomy.
- Comecon**—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Founded in 1949; headquartered in Moscow. In 1989 members were Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Vietnam. Purpose was to promote economic development of member states through cooperation and specialization.
- Dobruja** (var., Dobrudja and Dobrogea)—Black Sea coastal lands lying south of the Danube in southeastern Romania and northeastern Bulgaria.
- Extensive economic development**—Expanding production by adding resources rather than by improving the efficiency with which these resources are exploited.
- Fiscal Year (FY)**—One-year financial accounting period; in Romania coincides with calendar year.
- GATT**—General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. An international organization established in 1948 and headquartered in Geneva that serves as a forum for international trade negotiations. GATT members pledge to further multilateral trade by reducing import tariffs, quotas, and preferential trade agreements and promise to extend to each other any favorable trading terms offered in subsequent agreements with third parties.
- GNA**—Grand National Assembly. Nominally the supreme organ of state power, it was essentially a rubber-stamp legislature of

- 369 deputies elected every five years. It met twice yearly and in special sessions as necessary.
- GNP—gross national product. The total value of goods and services produced in a nation during a specified period, usually one year.
- Greater Romania—Following World War I, Romania incorporated Transylvania, Bessarabia, Bukovina, the eastern Banat, and southern Dobruja. It subsequently lost much of this territory.
- IMF—International Monetary Fund. Established along with the World Bank (*q. v.*) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members when they experience balance-of-payment difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients.
- județ* (pl., *județe*)—Local administrative division corresponding to county or district. There are forty such units plus the municipality of Bucharest and the surrounding Ilfov Agricultural District.
- leu (pl., lei)—Standard unit of currency, divided into 100 bani. The official exchange rate in January 1989 stood at 14.5 lei per US\$1, but the actual rate varied according to type of transaction.
- Moldavia (var., Moldova and Moldau)—Former principality, east of Transylvania (*q. v.*) and north and east of Walachia (*q. v.*).
- multilaterally developed socialist state—The proclaimed goal for Romania's social and economic development to be achieved by the year 2000. The goal envisioned an industrially advanced socialist nation with an efficient and productive agriculture and a well-educated population enjoying a high standard of living.
- national income—The total value of a nation's material production, excluding depreciation, achieved in one year.
- New Economic and Financial Mechanism—Economic reforms introduced in March 1978, the first of numerous efforts to improve economic management and planning by increasing the decision-making powers of individual enterprises and *centrale* (*q. v.*). The reforms were implemented only half-heartedly.
- PCR—Partidul Comunist Român (Romanian Communist Party). The ruling and only legal political party. Founded in 1921, the Communist Party was declared illegal in 1924 and operated underground until 1944. The party came to power as a result of the Soviet occupation during the final year of World War II. In 1948 it merged with one wing of the Social Democratic

- Party to form the Romanian Workers' Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Român—PMR). In 1965 the party assumed its present name.
- Polexco—Political Executive Committee. The politburo of the PCR (*q.v.*), the party's primary policy-making body. In 1988 there were nineteen members, most of whom held other important party and government positions.
- Procuratura—Office of the prosecutor general, established in 1952, it operates the court system, decides jurisdictional questions, compiles crime statistics, and oversees the central criminology institute and forensic science laboratory.
- Securitate—Popular term for the Departamentul Securității Statului (Department of State Security), the secret police. On a per capita basis, Romania had the largest such service in Eastern Europe.
- socialism (adj., socialist)—In Marxist theory, a stage of historical development transitional between capitalism and communism. Romania claimed to have attained socialism by 1965.
- Sublime Porte (short form, the Porte)—Term used by Europeans to designate the Ottoman court or the government of Ottoman Turkey; derived from the gate (port) of the sultan's palace, at which justice was administered in ancient times.
- Transylvania (var., Transilvania)—Region of northwestern and central Romania of triangular shape, bounded on the north, east, and south by the Carpathian Mountains and Transylvanian Alps.
- UGSR—Uniunea Generală a Sindicatelor din România (General Union of Trade Unions). Official organization incorporating all labor unions of blue- and white-collar workers. Membership in 1985 was 7.3 million.
- UTC—Uniunea Tineretului Comunist (Union of Communist Youth). Official organization that functioned as the youth branch of the PCR (*q.v.*). Membership open to young people between ages fifteen and twenty-six. Membership in 1984 estimated at 3.7 million.
- voivode*—A Slavic term designating a military leader, adopted for a time by the rulers or princes of Wallachia and Moldavia.
- Wallachia (var., Wallachia)—Former principality between the Danube and Transylvanian Alps in southern Romania.
- Warsaw Treaty Organization—Formal name for Warsaw Pact. Military alliance of communist countries founded in 1955, with headquarters in Moscow. The Soviet minister of defense was traditionally the supreme commander of Warsaw Pact forces. Members were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the IMF (*q.v.*).

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